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Lena Larsen, co-ordinator of the Oslo Coalition and president of the Islamic Council Norway Nelly van Doorn-Harder, Oddbjørn Leirvik, Faculty of Theology, University
of Kari Vogt, Dag Kaspersen, Åssiden parish, Church of Hans Morten Haugen, Norwegian Institute of Human
Rights, List of contents:1 Background and introduction 2 The political and legal scene 2a The shari‘a
question 3 National cohesion and communal conflicts 4 Interfaith co-operation in Indonesia5 Current trends in Islamic thought 5a The centrality
of women’s issues 7 Civic and Religious Education 7a Civic or citizenship education 8 Bibliography 1 Background and introductionIn the autumn of 2000, the Oslo Coalition for
Freedom of Religion or Belief decided to investigate the possibilities
for a co-operation with individuals and organisations in From the outset, the Oslo Coalition was acquainted with the plans for an official Norwegian-Indonesian dialogue about human rights, which from 2002 has been implemented in co-operation with the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights. Whereas the official human rights dialogue will engage representatives of the authorities and of public institutions such as the judicial system, the Oslo Coalition will focus on civil society and emphasise the role and responsibilities of the faith communities. With a view to finances, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was approached and stated their readiness to support a planning
project. A planning seminar was held in November 2002, with Olle
Törnquist ( The current report is based on impressions from
our encounters with persons and organisations in With regard to interfaith organisations, the delegation
spent an afternoon with Interfidei in their house in As to Muslim organisations, our priority was the Nahdlatul ‘Ulama and Muhammadiyah networks. Their broad popular basis as mass organisations, their educational activities and their engagement in reformist Islamic thought imply that the networks of these organisations constitute the most vital and influential part of civil society in Indonesia. In accordance with our priorities, we spent most our time with their women’s and youth networks. We also met with representatives of smaller Muslim organisations with an outspoken liberal agenda, namely Paramadina and the Liberal Islam Network. With regard to the churches, our priority was to meet with representatives of ecumenical networks and educational institutions on the Protestant side, and with well-informed Catholic fathers and representatives of the educational activities of the Catholic church. In tune with the Oslo Coalition’s emphasis on
the role of school education in fostering interreligious tolerance
and freedom of religion or belief, we met with representatives of
several educational institutions. Regarding primary and secondary
education, our main focus was on private schools run by Nahdlatul
‘Ulama (pesantren in Jombang), other Muslim foundations and
the Catholic church. But we also informed ourselves (by meetings
in the Ministry of National Education) about current developments
with regard to religious and civic education in the public school
system. At the level of higher learning, we visited the State Islamic
University and State Institute of Islamic Studies in 2 The political and legal sceneIn the recent years, in the wake the fall of As can be seen from the violent confrontations
in recent years – culminating in the bombing in 2a The shari‘a questionDuring the delegation visit, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) discussed a package of proposed amendments to the 1945 Constitution. Main issues were the establishment of a constitutional commission aimed at a general revision of the Constitution, direct presidential elections, the removal of special seats in MPR for the so-called interest groups (i.e., the police and the military), and a proposal to introduce a reference to shari‘a in paragraph 29 of the Constitution. Direct presidential elections and removal of the interest groups was finally agreed upon, whereas the shari‘a proposal was turned down. An expression of the pluralist Pancasila ideology
of The 2002 proposal was put forward by the three Islamic-based parties PPP (the United Development Party of Hamzah Haz, the current vice president), PBB (the Crescent Star Party) and PDU (Daulatul Ummah Party) which received a total of about 14 % of the votes in the 1999 elections. Previous to the debate in the People’s Consultative Assembly, both Nahdlatul ‘Ulama and Muhammadiyah had taken a clear stand against the proposed inclusion of a reference to shari‘a in the constitution. During our visit to various pesantren in
the rural NU-context of Jombang, we asked about their opinion on
the current shari‘a-debate. The teachers
responded that they were against the inclusion of shari‘a in the constitution, since " In our discussions with representatives of NU and Muhammadiyah, our general impression was that NU has taken a more principled stand against a reference to shari‘a in the Constitution. The position of Muhammadiyah seems to be slightly more pragmatic. But parts of Muhammadiyah too seems to be moving in the direction of a more principled, pluralist position in the question of religion and state. Whereas NU-representatives spoke of the need to "deformalise" shari‘a from law to ethical code, people from Muhammadiyah seem often to reason along the following line of thought: there is nothing wrong with shari‘a itself, but in the way it is interpreted by its current proponents, a further implementation of shari‘a at the legal level is probably not a good idea. Also, the fact that there is no reliable law enforcement in the country raised doubts in the minds of those who in principle might be open to a further inclusion of shari‘a-based principles in general legislation. By women, it was often pointed out that if shari‘a was further formalised as public law, the flexibility of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) would also be lost. All our informants agreed that in the current
situation, symbolic references to shari‘a in the constitutions followed
by attempts at practical shari‘a enforcement outside the established
realm of family law jurisdiction will most likely victimise women
and further jeopardise the prospects of reconciliation and peaceful
interreligious co-existence in Indonesia. The cultural dimension
of the shari‘a debate was emphasised by
many, who argued that in the present situation campaigns to implement
shari‘a reflect the combined influence of traditional patriarchy
and "Arab" pressure groups. Recent experiences from shari‘a
enforcements in Aceh were cited as examples of how "implementation
of shari‘a" in the present cultural and political climate mainly
meant seclusion and veiling of women (for instance, by means of
police controls ensuring that all women were wearing the jilbab
– the headscarf – within a distance of two hundred meters from
a mosque). Because of the openings linked with decentralisation
politics and the influence of regional interest groups, many indicated
that the shari‘a question was much more
difficult to handle at the regional than at the national level.
2b Religious freedom and interreligious relationsThe general impression left with the delegation
was that of a strong and confident co-operation between the leaders
of the mainstream churches and the dominant Muslim networks of NU
and Muhammadiyah. But there are pressure groups on both sides which
by their confrontational discourses and actions increase communal
tension in many of the regions With a view to religious freedom, many of our informants claimed that "shariasation from below" in the regions is the main threat. For Christians, the government decree from 1970 that the building of new churches must be approved of by the local authorities and the local community, has always been regarded as a potential human rights problem, but more as an exception to the general rule of non-discrimination which has prevailed. With pressure from below, this problem may now become aggravated. Furthermore, the recent church burnings and attacks on mosques have brought the issue of efficient protection of holy places to the fore. In a human rights' perspective, popular violation of churches and mosques highlights the responsibility of the authorities (the police, and the courts) to protect holy places and to bring the perpetrators to justice. With regard to inter-communal conflicts and the
situation of religious minorities, many of our informants pointed
to the fact that in lack of a reliable rule of law, relatively small
but violent groups may incur much damage. An episode in Solo (a
main city in In light of this episode and numerous indications that the interreligious violence in the Moluccas and Sulawesi has been instigated by factions in the military and allowed to spread by a general lack of police and law enforcement, the decision to focus on the rule of law in the official Norwegian-Indonesian human rights dialogue, seems to be wise. In a wider perspective, it seems clear that the
re-establishment of communal harmony in
3 National cohesion and communal conflictsThe reasons for the recent communal conflicts in the regions can obviously not be reduced to a common denominator. Each regional conflict has its particular nature. But some general observations can still be made. Many of our informants expressed the view that the real issues behind the outbreaks of communal violence from the latter part of the 1990s were either tribal/ethnic or socio-economic in nature. But religious allegiance has also played a major part, resulting in a dangerous blend of regional conflicts and identity politics. The triggers have been manifold: resettlement programs and reorganisation of administrative units which have toppled the demographic balance in certain regions; the fight for control over natural resources; the destabilising influence of criminal youth gangs as well as of disloyal elements within the military; the lack of reliable police- and law enforcement; and the establishment of militant groups with a national agenda such as Laskar Jihad (which was formed in response to a perceived threat to the safety of Muslims in the Moluccan islands). Another factor is the lack of reliable information about the events, which makes it more easy to manipulate the interpretation of violent incidents. Against this background, the PGI has proposed the establishment of joint crisis centres – as a much needed co-operation between Christian and Muslim organisations and representatives of the authorities. In a broader perspective, the regional conflicts are also linked with an unresolved tension between national and religious allegiance in Indonesian identity perceptions. During the New Order regime of Suharto, the religious discourse was dominated by a tightly controlled discourse of nationalism – connected to forced declarations of loyalty to the state ideology of Pancasila. Most of our informants expressed the view that although Pancasila may still represent the national consensus of the religious communities, it has been severely discredited by an authoritarian misuse of Pancasila principles as a stick against non-conformists. Pancasila must therefore be rehabilitated and reformulated. In accordance with the enforced state ideology, in public discourses during the reign of Suharto people related to each other as Indonesian nationals and citizens and downplayed the role that religion played in their search for identity. But some Muslim groups took advantage of Suharto’s increasingly Muslim appearance and consolidated their power by strengthening their particularist dimension of Islamic identity. During the same period, Muslims were forbidden to congratulate Christians on the occasion of Christmas. Many Muslims also joined the national resettlement program and moved to areas where Christians had traditionally formed the majority (Ambon, Papua and East Timor). The Christians, on the other hand, used the discourse of pancasila nationalism in an attempt to maintain their political power in the same regions and tried to penetrate into areas with a Muslim majority by citing the human rights’ principle of freedom of religion. During the 1990s, it became clearer than before that religious ties were perceived by many to be stronger than cultural and ethnic bonds – which had lost much of their strength because of sociological changes. By playing down the role of religion in the identity formation of the Indonesian people and by insisting that Indonesian identity should be defined by the pancasial ideology only, the Suharto regime had created a vacuum which was now filled by fundamentalist factions such as Laskar Jihad on the Muslim side. Also among the Christians, fundamentalist movements appeared with the aim of Christianising the whole of Indonesia and eliminating any traits of Muslim culture (such as the established use of the name of "Allah" in Indonesian bibles) from Christian discourse. After having been banned for more than thirty years under Suharto, the discourse of religious identity came out like a flood and religious differences seemed to take its revenge after having been suppressed in public discourses for a long time. The cited shift in dominant discourses was seen
as a threat by all our informants, Muslims as well as Christians.
Some NU-representatives added that the hardliner groups on the Muslim
side are often led by Muslims who take
their inspiration from "Arab" sources and not from the
contextualised form of Islam that has prevailed in From the Christian side, it was noted that some of the hardliner Christian groups take their inspiration from American, charismatic Christianity. The "hardliner" groups of either side are not necessarily violent (most of them are not), but their radical discourse and sectarian identity politics may nevertheless serve to fuel outbursts of communal violence. The major outbreaks of communal violence since 1999 have been in the Moluccas and in Sulawesi. As for the interreligious components, it was noted that although there have been relatively few attacks in the same period on Christians in Java and Sumatra, Christians generally feel unsafe. Conversely, Muslim villagers feel their interests threatened by perceived Christian expansion. The question was raised: How can there be peace, when both parts see themselves as victims? Regarding the situation in Java, we were given
divergent interpretations of the Sitobondo riots in 1996 and other
incidents of communal violence which have not necessarily taken
the form of religious clashes. Some stressed the cultural element
in such violence and its possible roots in the aggressive sub-currents
of Javanese escapism and mysticism – currents that may suddenly
erupt into irrational violence such as burning of houses and killings.
It was noted that also the violence against the communists in 1965
could partly be explained in the same way – and most people have
never been willing to speak honest and openly about this. Others
focused rather on socio-economic factors and the dramatic changes
in village economies related to globalisation and monopolisation
of the economy – changes that have severely affected the lives of
ordinary NU-people. Teachers at NU-pesantren in Jombang gave a different picture of the situation in their area. Responding to our question about local Muslim-Christian relations, the teachers claimed that Muslims and Christians are living harmoniously together in this part of Java – "even though this has been an area of Dutch missionary activity and also has got a substantial Chinese Catholic population. After 11 September we care even more about our good relations with the Christians."
4 Interfaith co-operation in
Despite a looming disruption of national unity and several violent conflicts in the regions, several examples of increased interreligious solidarity and networking were also told. For example, a peace forum was established on the initiative of Muslims (even with the support of some hardliners) after the burning of churches during Christmas 2000. Many Muslims have also volunteered to protect churches during Christmas and Easter celebrations, in Yogyakarta and other places. But the role of religious leaders in instigating confrontations and violence cannot be overlooked. Some Protestant pastors claimed that when trying to understand the factors that may lead to outbursts of communal violence, the fundamental lack of understanding between many Christians and Muslims must be taken seriously – as a call for more concerted efforts at relation building and more courageous attempts at dialogues in the open. As a sign of hope, it was noted that Muslim and Christian leaders in Java increasingly make contact on the local level – now on the basis of religious identity and not merely of nationalism. Many of our Christian informants emphasised that good relations to mainstream Muslims are more important than police protection. But the idea of Muslims protecting Christians – although much appreciated when performed as an act of solidarity in critical situations – was also questioned by some: "We don’t like the language of protection – that is why we want to develop a civil society (madaniya). We don’t want to be dhimmis!" With regard to the national level, we were informed
that in 2002, NU initiated a new program for moral awakening and
interreligious solidarity in co-operation with Muhammadiyah, PGI,
KPI (the catholic bishop’s conference), Hindus and others – under
the title of a "National morality campaign". The initiative
was mentioned by several as a new and promising structure for interfaith
co-operation, nationally and regionally. Several such structures
have evolved in different cities and regions. For instance, Muslim,
Catholic and Protestant leaders in This recent initiative adds to the efforts made
by the established forums for interreligious dialogue and co-operation,
such as Interfidei, Madia and ICRP. During the 1990s, interreligious
dialogue has become institutionalised in The Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace distinguishes itself as a formal and representative body for interreligious dialogue. Established in 2000, it could be described as a networking effort between the different groups that are committed to interreligious coexistence and pluralism. The recent conflict within ICRP (or rather, between ICRP and the Indonesian members of the Asian Conference on Religion and Peace, i.e. the regional body) was interpreted by some as a sign of the tension between an inherited New Order approach to dialogue focused on the formalised co-operation between state recognised religions, and a more open approach based on a fundamental acceptance of inter- as well as intra-religious pluralism. The second oldest forum for interreligious dialogue
is Madia, the Society for Inter-Religious Dialogue which was established
in 1996. Based in The oldest of the existing forums for interfaith
dialogue in The people at Interfidei also shared the experience made by some of estrangement from their own religious community, because of a lack of understanding for dialogue among the traditional religious leaders, resulting perhaps in a new sense of "interreligious community" among those committed to interfaith solidarity and action. Christian and Muslim dialogue activists thus often
strike inter-religious alliances which may be felt to be controversial
in both camps. In inter-religious dialogue, internal differences
must be taken just as seriously as efforts at overcoming boundaries
between the religions. Noting, for example, that the main problem
in
5 Current trends in Islamic thoughtHow do the various Muslim networks respond to
the present challenges? Our main guides during our visits to Jakarta-Jombang
and 5a The centrality of women’s issuesA uniting bond between NU and Muhammadiyah is their firm resolution to be fully independent of the political authorities – as free agents in civil society. Another common feature is the strong women’s organisations in both organisations. In both NU and Muhammadiyah, women’s issues seems to be a major trigger behind the current efforts at a hermeneutically refined interpretation of the Qur’an and a reformulation of shari‘a which is sensitive to women's rights. In Muhammadiyah, women have recently been accepted as central board members. Due to its nature of being a movement of the ‘ulama, NU has not yet taken a similar step. In our meeting with a member of the Executive Council of Nahdlatul ‘Ulama, Lena Larsen (who is also the president of the Islamic Council in Norway) challenged NU on this point, suggesting that the concept of ‘ulama should be widened so as to include women. She received firm support from Lily Munir of the central board of Muslimat NU, who has often made the same point in the internal discussions of NU. The representative of the Executive Council agreed that the question of women in governing boards should now be discussed seriously. Another prominent representative of female activism in NU is Ibu Nuriyah, the wife of Abdurrahman Wahid. Ibu Nuriyah has dedicated much of her energy to combatting the legacy of polygamy which has been revigorated in some Islamist circles and legitimised by the current Vice President of Indonesia who practices polygamy. Some elderly kiai also have the habit of taking a second, younger wife. According to Ibu Nuriyah, NU has nevertheless taken a clearer stand against polygamy than Muhammadiyah. Some NU-pesantren have also established crisis centra for victims of domestic violence, a fact which was considered by Ibu Nuriyah as a major breaktrough for women's rights. In her books and by her interventions in media, Ibu Nuriyah has published her exegetical efforts aimed at reinterpreting qur'anic concepts and injunctions, concluding i.a. that the qur'anic ideal is monogamy and that womens' free choice of spouse (possibly, also a non-Muslim) should in no way be restricted. In the question of how to understand the term qawwamun in Qur'an 4:34, which has traditionally been interpreted as men's authority over women, Ibu Nuriyah holds the view that the term rather refers to those – men or women – who support their family in the sense of providing for it. In principle, therefore, a women may also be the head of the family. In the fatwa committee of Majlis Ulama Indonesia, four of members are women – including the famous Qur’an reciter, Maria Ulfa, whom we also had the pleasure to meet. In the question of Qur’an recitation, the NU gave a fatwa as early as in 1978 which challenged the traditional perception of women's voice as ‘awra ("nakedness") and sactioned that women might recite in mixed audiences on official occasions such as feasts and weddings. Maria Ulfa, who has published a treatise on women-related fiqh (Risalah Fiqh Wanita), has become a symbol of this opportunity and also advocated other women's rights' issues such as their access to being judges. In our meeting, she argued that in order to safeguard women's rights, the legacy of the different Islamic schools of law must be allowed to be used in a creative way. In our visit to Jombang – a typical rural stronghold of NU, where its founder is buried – we experienced that in certain NU-circles, a commitment to women’s empowerment may go further back than the present generations. In the Sunan Ampel pesantren – the pesantren of Lily Munir’s family – we met with her mother Ibu Abida. A mother of 11 children, she became a member of the district council and a shari‘a judge who also took part in the great Kompilasi Islam effort (the compilation of Indonesian shari‘a) which was completed in 1984. Her husband Mahfudz Anwar (the founder and first kiai of this pesantren) encouraged both her and his daughters to educate themselves and take responsibility in society. Similar to the interpretation of Ibu Nuriyah cited above, he held the view that qawwamun in Qur’an 4:34 did not mean that men should exercise "authority" over women but rather that they should "stand up for" them in the sense of empowering women. As can be seen from the following paragraphs, women's issues was also a central focus in our conversations with several other Muslims organisations and individuals. 5b Muhammadiyah and NU – the historical backgroundMuhammadiyah was established in Nahdlatul ‘Ulama (or Nahdatul ‘Ulama) was established
in Surabaya in 1926, with the aim of strengthening traditional Islam
and unifying Indonesian Muslims against secular nationalist ideologies
and the rival religious appeals of Muhammadiyah. NU’s base has mainly
been rural, and its backbone is the country’s network of ‘ulama,
the local spiritual leaders known as kiai and the indigenous madrasa
school system known as pesantren. The number of NU followers
is estimated to 30-35 millions. Whereas its outlook was originally
traditionalist, more recent developments have made Nahdlatul ‘Ulama
a symbol of a "contextualist" (pribumisasi) approach
to Islam. Through the political thought of Abdurrahman Wahid and
other leaders with a similar line of thought, NU has become a stronghold
for pluralist thought in The existence of such large and well-functioning Muslim networks as NU and Muhammadiyah, in which new lines of thought in the leadership may trickle down to millions of adherents, is a rather unique feature of Indonesian Islam which makes the role of religious organisations in civil reform and raising of human rights' awareness all the more important. The relation between Muhammadiyah and NU has sometimes
been tense and conflicts flared up again after Abdurrahman Wahid
was deposed as president in 2001. But there have also been renewed
efforts at reconciliation. Both NU and Muhammadiyah have – through
some of their prominent leaders – been associated with party politics,
with strong links to the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman
Wahid and the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Amien Rais respectively.
Both organisations have also, however, tried to regain their identity
as independent social and religious movements. 5c Nahdlatul ‘Ulama and "contextual Islam"In a meeting in Jakarta with Cecep Syarifuddin
from the Executive Council of Nahdlatul ‘Ulama, it was emphasised
that NU no longer had any ambition of being a political party but
rather aimed at serving the nation as a whole. The above mentioned
National Morality Campaign was launched in co-operation with the
leaders of other religious communities as a response to the current
crisis of values and institutions in In a session with NU’s Office for Human Resource Studies and Development (Lakpesdam), we were shown how their ideas of a "deformalisation of shari‘a", a "rational fiqh" and a "pluralist" and "post-traditionalist" Islam were expressed in publications such as the journal Afkar. In this journal, the vision of a contextual Islam is merged with the ideas of leading "pluralist" Muslims in the internationally such as Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na‘im, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and Farid Esack. The unique feature of NU is expressed by Lakpesdam’s combined effort at intellectual renewal and local network building in the districts. Their local leadership training programs aim not solely at strengthening the NU network but also at the formation of citizen forums which often include non-Muslims. In all their activities, Lakpesdam puts also much emphasis on women's rights. Women's rights is the
main focus of the Fatayat Welfare Foundation (the organisation of
the young women in NU, known as YKF). In our meeting with YKF and
some young kiai in Their strategy is to focus on methodology, in recognition of the fact that only thus can
previous moral and legal decisions be superseded in a manner which
is likely to gain support. We were explained by the young activists
that a main point in their reinterpretive strategy is to point out
the highly patriarchal context in According to the explanation of these young activists, the contextual method was incepted in the 1970s by leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid who initially became unpopular but nevertheless were able to gain strongholds in the pesantren milieu. It was emphasised that a liberating reinterpretation of the Qur’an must be a gradual process. The process has, however, already produced some new and more liberal kiai. Many young people now fulfil the criteria for ijtihad – as scholars trained in the classical disciplines but with a modern outlook. It is exactly this combination of traditional training (from the pesantren system) and modern outlook on religion (as it can also be acquired in some of the State Institutes of Islamic Studies) which seems to be the distinctive advantage of NU. Their classical santri (formal Islamic) schooling of these kiai make them different from Muhammadiyah youth with a similar outlook. Both groups can, however, be characterised as progressive thinkers in the sense of "pious" or "believing" modernists". It was emphasised by several NU people that the current efforts
at contextual reinterpretation of Islam is not merely a "liberal"
effort. They are based on a social conscience and linked with a
sensitivity towards the real hardships of women and village
people which increasingly find themselves marginalized by changes
related to liberalisation and monopolisation of the economy. These
changes severely affect the lives of ordinary NU-people. Mochammad
Maksum, the new leader of NU in 5d MuhammadiyahIn our meetings with Muhammadiyah representatives
in In our meeting with ‘Aisyiyah, the women’s organisation of Muhammadiyah, it was expressed that there should be an interreligious discussion about religious values and national unity – "but our main responsibility is educating the Muslims." The focus of ‘Aisyiyah´s work is "the role of religious women
in civil society", – materialised in educational institutions
ranging from kindergartens to midwife- and nursery schools. But
like the women of NU, they too are struggling with patriarchal attitudes
and corresponding interpretations of the Qur’an (in particular,
the notorious problem of how Qur’an In a meeting with Nashiyatul ‘Aisyiyiah – the young women of ‘Aisyiyah – and men and women from the university students’ associations of Muhammadiyah, it was mentioned that the students’ association had received international support from the Asia Foundation and (as a concrete example) from the British Council for a conference on "Living in plural societies". The keen interest in "pluralism" seems in fact to be a uniting bond between youth and student groups in both NU, Muhammadiyah and the declared liberal networks such as Paramadina (see below). Many Muhammadiyah students – so we were told – are influenced by "liberal thought". They are discussing issues such as liberal theology, religion and state, democracy and interreligious dialogue – i.e., the same issues that are keenly debated by the advocates for "contextual" and "liberal" Islam in their respective networks. In women’s and youth networks, one may thus identify a convergence of "liberal" interest across organisational divides. Much like the young women of NU, Muhammadiyah’s young women and students focus on gender awareness, women’s rights in everyday life and (like Interfidei and other interfaith networks) anti-violence training in conflict areas. In response to our questions about the relation between the youth and students’ organisation and the senior leadership in Muhammadiyah, it was stated that "the culture in Java can be very paternalistic and this has also put its mark on Muhammadiyah." It was emphasised that although the theology of the youth and students’ organisation in the main follows that of Muhammadiyah, they are independent and may often criticise Muhammadiyah in such questions as gender equality and contextual interpretation of the Qur’an. It was also explained that Muhammadiyah youth and students did not affiliate with any particular party (although many sided with new PAN party of Amien Rais in 1999). As for possible generation conflicts, we got the impression from some of the students at Muhammadiyah University that "it is not quite open here, the teachers are too dominating." Explaining that women needs to wear the jilbab (the headscarf) inside the university, one of the teachers added a complaint that many took it off outside the campus – a fact seemingly taken as a token of the increasing permissiveness in society. The general impression, however, was that the "new headscarf" has a strong position as an identity mark among the committed young women in Muhammadiyah. As for the current debate on shari‘a,
it has already been noted that Muhammadiyah opposed the proposal
of the Islamic parties in 2002 to include a reference to shari‘a
in the constitution (cf. part I above, "Introduction and background").
It should be added, however, that some observers raised the question
of where exactly Muhammadiyah stands in this matter. Do they see
shari‘a as a formalised system of law,
which ideally should be implemented in legal terms, or as moral
values (cf. the "deformalising" approach to shari‘a typical
of the NU avant-garde and other liberals)? As noted by one Christian
observer, "the current leadership seems to take a clear pluralist
stand, but there are hardliners as well in Muhammadiyah". 5e IAIN, Paramadina and the Liberal Islam NetworkPersons involved in formulating a "contextual", "pluralist" and "gender conscious" Islam belong to networks which apparently overlap. As it will be further described below (under Education), the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN) – particularly those in Jakarta and Yogyakarta – have played an important role in the development of reformist, liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. Teachers and researchers engaged by IAIN may have their background in either NU, Muhammadiyah or Paramadina, but their commitment to some pivotal issues such as plural society, human rights, gender awareness and interreligious relations clearly converge. As an example, Professor Komaruddin Hidayat of IAIN Jakarta (now a full fledged university, UIN) is also an activist in Paramadina, and rector Amin Abdallah at IAIN Yogyakarta maintains his relations with Muhammadiyah and was elected as the leader of their fatwa council Majlis Tarjih in 1995. The council has become a forum for developing new Islamic thought and women are invited into the process (three women are currently on the board of Muhammadiyah). In the present Indonesian context, Amin Abdullah stands out as one of the most profiled, liberal Muslim thinkers. He has published several books with a great influence on social-, gender- and interfaith issues. In a meeting with him (see below, under Education), Amin Abdullah expressed his personal view that an-Na‘im's book Toward an Islamic Reformation is currently the best and most innovative work in this field. Significantly, he explained, the Indonesian edition of an- Na‘im's book was given the title "the deconstruction of shari‘a". In recent research on modern trends in Indonesian Islam, Greg Barton and other researchers have employed the term "neo-modernist thought" to describe some common features of Abdurrahman Wahid’s "contextual Islam" and the liberal vision of Islam associated with Nurcholish Majid. Differently from many Muhammadiyah leaders who lack a background in traditional Islamic scholarship, Abdurrahman Wahid and Nurcholish Majid combine their traditional schooling with impulses from modern Western thought and liberal impulses channelled through the State Institutes for Islamic Studies in Jakarta and Yogyakarta. Calling for a fresh ijtihad as a response to modern challenges, they hold the view that progress in society at the technological, social, intellectual and moral levels must also be reflected in Islamic law. The Paramadina network initiated by Nurcholish Majid has focused much of their energy on publications and educational renewal, as expressed through their Madania schools (see below) and their Paramadina University in the Jakarta area. Differently from the vast networks of NU and Muhammadiyah, Paramadina understands itself (in the words of Komaruddin Hidayat) as "a small group with big ideas" with the aim of further developing a liberal, intellectual Islamic discourse Indonesia. The Liberal Islam Network, which is led by Ulil Abshar Abdallah, was established in 1998 as a response to Islamist revivalism. Himself a symbol of interreligious learning, he has been a student of the Jesuit scholar Franz Magnis Suseno, in addition to his studies in Islamic universities. His Liberal Islam Network produces publications and radio talk shows and organises discussion groups at the universities (realising that the universities are the main bases of the radical and sometimes militant Islam of the "hardliners"). According to Ulil Abshar Abdallah, the basic conviction of any trend which labels itself "liberal Islam" is that no school of thought in Islam can claim to hold the sole truth. In the political realm, "liberal Islam" means struggling for civil liberties such as freedom of expression, minority rights, women’s rights and freedom of religion ("why does Islamic revivalism – in their justified fervour for social justice – always want to restrict human freedom?"). The Liberal Islam Network has also addressed sensitive human rights issues such as interreligious marriages (prohibited by law in Indonesia from 1974, but still widespread) and the difficulties that Christians encounter when wanting to build new churches. As sources of inspiration for the Liberal Islam Network, the names of several controversial Islamic thinkers in the West, in the Middle East and in South Africa were mentioned – for example, Abdullahi Ahmed an-Na‘im, Mohammed Arkoun, Ibrahim Musa, Farid Esack, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Hasan Hanafi and more traditionally oriented scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Many of the works of these authors have been translated into Indonesian, and the State Institutes for Islamic Studies in Jakarta and Yogyakarta has functioned as important channels for their thoughts. The ambition of the Liberal Islam Network is to remake their impluses in the local context, in conjunction with the legacy of "neo-modernist thought" in Indonesia. Ulil Abshar Abdallah emphasised that reformist Muslim thinkers in Indonesia, seeing e.g. an-Na‘im's ideas of an Islamic reformation (cf. his book Toward and Islamic Reformation) as a hypothesis to be discussed, not as a vision to be copied. The main issue of interesest, said Ulil Abshar Abdallah, was an-Na‘im's discussion of the notion of citizenship and his insistencs that the modern notion of citizenship requires a rethinking of classical shari‘a. People from the Liberal Islam Network are also
active in interfaith organisations such as the Indonesian Conference
on Religion and Peace. They may take some of their inspiration from
Christian theologians of religion such as Hans Küng. But they are
also trying to respond to the deep-rooted prejudices against Islam
among many Indonesian Christians. In response to our questions about
how to deal with qur’anic verses that are negative to Christianity,
Ulil Abshar Abdallah emphasised that antagonisms can only be overcome
when Muslims and Christians learn to tackle the hard questions (another
example is violence and its possible roots in the religious traditions)
together. He also underlined, however, that intra-Muslim dialogue
was often felt as a more pressing challenge than inter-religious
conversation. 5f Indonesian Islam – its real and conflicted diversityNeedless to say, the above reflections about current trends in Muslim movements in Indonesia cannot do justice to the rich and conflicted diversity of Indonesian Islam. As mentioned in the introduction, an alliance of Islamic parties have long been pressing for an implementation of shari‘a which may or may not gain increased support in the time to come. Other parts of the Muslim reality in Indonesia was only seen in glimpses – such as militants from Laskar Jihad in white garbs selling newspapers at road junctions, or traditional Muslim pilgrims displaying their "syncretistic" (in the view of the puritans) faith by reaching out for the blessing of Buddha in the stupas of Borobodur. As for the relation between NU and the religious customs in Indonesian folk Islam, we were explained that NU still accepts the widespread popular practices in folk Islam (not only in Indonesia) connected with amulets and mantras or meditation in seclusion during certain periods of life. Our encounters with youth, women and senior leaders in NU, Muhammadiayh and the liberal Islam networks gave the impression of a strong convergence in the direction of a pluralist, democratic vision of Islam. But the following overheard reflection should not be neglected: "the militant hardliners are few but they have money and are prepared to give everything in the struggle, whereas the moderates are often sleeping".
6 Current developments in the churchesAlthough the percentage of Christians does probably not exceed 10% at the national level (3% Catholics, 5-7% Protestants), in many regions the Christian constitute a much larger part of the population. This is not only true of several regions in the Moluccas and Sulawesi, but also of Yogyakarta which may have about 20% Christian inhabitants (indicative of the fact that religious statistic is seldom an exact science, the percentage of Christians in Yogyakarta given by our informants varied between 15 and 30%). As for the long term development, it was argued by one Catholic observer that the total number of Indonesian Christians have probably not increased by more than 1% during the last 30 years. As for the growth of Pentecostal churches, they feed on the other churches mainly. As noted, in some of these circles a radical discourse has been emerging aimed at purging Indonesian Christianity from cultural elements that may be identified as "Muslim" (not least, the convention of speaking of God as Allah), paired with an ambition to further "Christianise" Indonesia. There is also a new, evangelical council of churches which does not cooperate with established ecumenical body among the Protestants, the Communion of Churches in Indonesia (PGI). On the other side, there is also a attraction towards Greek and Syrian Orthodoxy among some artists and intellectuals. As mentioned above, Christians see the main threat to freedom of religion in the growth of Muslim militancy and the ongoing "shariasation from below" in certain regions. In addition to the destructive effect of church burnings, local developments have made it more difficult to build churches in some places. But more seriously, the violence and the intensified shari‘a discourse has spread a general feeling of insecurity among Indonesian Christians. On the other hand, several examples can also be cited of intensified contact between Christian and Muslims leaders on the local level, and Muslim leaders has often offered to protect churches during Christmas and Easter celebrations. One protestant observer noted that in many circles, people are still critical towards the PGI since they the previous leadership was thought to be too much tied up with the Suharto-regime. After the fall of Suharto, however, several initiatives have been taken to strengthen PGI as an independent actor in civil society – in co-operation with other faith communities. In our meeting with the current president, Natan Setiabudi, we were informed that until 2000 there was also a tradition of annual dialogue seminars with representatives of the other religions in Indonesia (initiated by the German theologian Olaf Schumann). After the recent communal clashes, the PGI has concentrated its efforts on contact with NU and Muhammadiyah. Together with the Catholic bishops’ conference (KPI), PGI was also actively involved in the Malinu agreements on Poso and Ambon, in this case with Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) as the Muslim partner. But unfortunately, trust is still not growing between ordinary Christians and Muslims and neither between the people and the authorities (unfortunately, the solidity of local authorities was simply taken for granted in the Malinu agreements). Setiabudi noted that "there are cultural bonds between Christians
and Muslims in At the theological level, efforts at formulating a contextual Christian theology (similar to the "contextual Islam" trend in NU) can be identified, for example as expressed in the writings of Emmanuel Gerrit Singgih at the Protestant Duta wacana university in Yogyakarta (cf. his book Berteologi dalam konteks, "doing theology in context"). The impression left by our meetings with Catholic fathers (all of them Jesuits) was that of a commitment to living the gospel in deep respect of other faiths and in sensitivity towards the cultural context. But the perception of the context changes with time. As one of the fathers explained, it was only ten or fifteen years ago that the relation to "Islam" began to be considered as the main contextual challenge for Indonesian Christianity. As for Christian involvement in interfaith issues, several networking initiatives have already been cited above – with Interfidei as the main institutional expression. At the level of higher education and research, several examples can be cited of co-operation between Catholic and Protestant universities on the one hand and Muslim private universities or State Institutes of Islamic Studies on the other (see below, under Education).
7 Civic and Religious EducationAs the Oslo Coalition has a special project on school education, interreligious dialogue and freedom of religion, the delegation wanted to inform itself about current developments regarding civic and religious education in Indonesian schools. The administration of the institutions involved in school education is divided between two different ministries. The Ministry of National Education (MONE) is responsible for the secular (government) schools, whereas the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) is responsible for the religious (private) schools. The percentage of pupils going to private schools varies from 99.6% at kindergarten level, 17% in primary school, 41% in junior secondary school and 53% in senior secondary school level. The pesantren madrasas have gradually been
included in the overall public school system. In average, 2/3 of
the time is spent on formal education in accordance with the public
curricula, whereas the remaining 1/3 of the time is dedicated to
informal education centred on extra diniyya (religious education)
in the early morning and in the evening. Muhammadiyah runs a different
system of Muslim private schools which caters for a large percentage
of the total education offered at primary and secondary levels.
There are also other Muslim private schools with their particular
traditions and visions. In addition, there are several Christian
private schools. 7a Civic or citizenship educationThe Education Act No. 2 of 1989 stated that the curriculum of all educational institutions in Indonesia – from primary to tertiary levels – should include both Pancasila education, religious education and citizenship education. Also pre-school education was supposed to include both "Pancasila morals education" and religion. Civic education has traditionally aimed at instilling in the student the values and obligations stated by the Preamble of the Indonesian Constitution and known as the five Pancasila principles: "[1] the belief in the One and Only godhead/God, [2] just and civilized humanity, [3] the unity of Indonesia, [4] democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations amongst representatives and [5] the realization of social justice for all of the people of Indonesia." According to the new Bill of Education which was passed in 2002, Pancasila education will cease to be a separate subject in school. Instead, it will be integrated in a revised subject of Civic Education (Kewarganegaraan, lit. "citizenship") which is supposed to be taught for two hours per week in primary and secondary school. Among our informants, there was a common understanding that both Civic/Pancasila and Religious education has been undermined by an outdated methodology focused on dogmatic memorizing, an authoritarian practice of the Pancasila ideology, and a dominant perception of religious authority in Indonesian society which has also deeply affected the school system. The new curriculum for Civic Education includes subjects such as democracy and human rights. Its introduction in primary and secondary schools is paralleled by Civic Education programs in some of the universities and the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (cf. the book published in 2000 by IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah: Pendidikan Kewargaan, lit. "citizenship education"). It was stated by some of our informants that Civic education can in fact be seen as a new way of implementing Pancasila values, only with a more critical and analytical approach. According to its architects, the new subject should aim at training the students in expressing their own opinion while fully respecting the other. The IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah has also a Civic education project for Muslim preachers and madrasa leaders which includes gender issues and human rights. Apart from the new subject of Civic education,
other pilot projects aimed at critical thinking and peace education
have also been tried out during the last years. In co-operation
with 7b Religious educationThe new Kurikulum Berbasis Kompetensi (basic competence curriculum) implies that three hours per week in primary school and two hours in secondary school will be set apart for Religious education (Pendidikan Agama). Religious education in public schools has traditionally been offered for adherents of the five recognised religions in Indonesia (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism and Hinduism). In public schools, every student is entitled to religious instruction according to his or her religion. However, normally a minimum number of students adhering to a particular faith is required before religious education is provided by the local school (the minimum number stated by different sources varied between 3-4 and 10). Islam-teachers are usually graduated from Islamic institutions and Christianity-teachers most often come from Christian seminaries. But there is a lack of qualified teachers in remote areas. If no suitable religious education can be offered in accordance with the students’ faith, they have – in principle – the right to be exempted from Agama. It was noted as a problem by one observer that there is no complaint mechanism in terms of law if children do not get what they are entitled to – or if teachers attack the tenets of other religions. Religious education is carried out in accordance with the national curricula. When revising the curricula, the ministry must consult the religious communities – using PGI as their Protestant partner and KPI as the catholic one. Textbooks are produced by autonomous publishers but screened by the Ministry of National Education. An addendum of article 39 of the Education Act of 1989 defined Religious education as an effort to strengthen the faith of school children or students towards the one supreme God – i.e., in tune with the Pancasila ideology. In 2002, the different curricula for Religious education were revised in accordance with a less dogmatic and more competence-oriented curricula for Indonesian schools. In tune with a general opening towards other religions than the five recognised ones, also education in Confucianism can now be offered as an option in school. In order to enhance the teachers’ knowledge of what is taught about other religions, the general competence aims for the other religions are now cited in the introduction to the curricula for every religion. The new curricula states also that all religions should be taught in accordance with the same pedagogical ideal – i.e. not only as a "subject", but with a view to living faith and moral practice. With regard to Islamic education provided in public
schools, one observer has noted that although it is often superficial
it projects a more universalistic interpretation of Islam than the
more traditional, allegedly "syncretistic" types of religiosity
in Indonesia. In our meeting with PGI, the president expressed the view that ideally, religion in school should be comparative religion, not teaching of discipleship. "But this is the idea of some intellectuals only". He also raised critical questions as to the real effectiveness of civic and religious education in the light of the current national crisis and the problems related to corruption and violence. But the PGI continues to be a partner for the Ministry of National Education, in a shared commitment to improve not only the curricula but the overall conditions for religious education in school.
7c Religious and civic education in private schoolsAs for private schools, they are free to add extra hours of religious education. There is an ongoing debate about whether the private schools too should be obliged to offer alternative options of religious education in accordance with the pupils’ faith, but the established tradition implies that in private schools, only a religious education which corresponds to the confessional nature of that particular school is available. In Parung outside Jakarta, Paramadina runs a primary and secondary
school called Madania. Madania is characterised by an international
outlook, a commitment to interfaith understanding, and modern pedagogics
applied within the framework of a modified government curriculum.
During our visit to Madania, we were explained that the foundational
vision of the school is to promote a democratic, humanistic and
pluralist Islam in Responding to a question raised after our visit to Madania, a representative of the Ministry of National Education confirmed that schools which offer multiple choices in religious education may modify the way in which religion is taught so that some hours may be spent together by the students of different faiths – in accordance with the general principle of local adaptation. The secondary school in the Madania complex is a boarding school with students from all over Indonesia, including Aceh. There are also plans for a new secondary school in Aceh. Indicative of the underlying vision of Madania, the classroom doors are decorated by the name signs of a great Western and Islamic intellectual or scientist side by side. Whereas Madania is (as yet) but one entity, Muhammadiyah runs several thousands of private schools at primary and secondary levels. In our meetings with Muhammadiyah representatives, we were explained that Muhammadiyah schools follow the national curriculum but add some practical religious activities. It was stated that Muhammadiyah schools are also supposed to respect local culture and to promote pluralism and diversity. A new curriculum for Civic Education has been implemented also in Muhammadiyah institutions of higher learning. Differently from the classical way of teaching the Qur'an in the pesantren system, Islamic education in Muhammadiyah schools has been characterised by a reflective approach to the Qur'an and Islamic tradition. A more interpretive approach to the Qur'an has also been introduced in some pesantren school. As noted above, it is the ambition of some young kiai to merge the classical methods of learning typical of the madrasa tradition with modern hermeneutical approaches. The delegation made a short visit to Balai Pendidikan, a well-known reform pesantren which is located in the vicinity of Borobodur. Balai Pendidikan was established in the 1960s as an independent foundation and has developed a strong interfaith commitment. For instance, it co-operates closely with catholic schools in the vicinity. In addition to Islam, Balai Pendidikan also teaches other world religions. The school follows the national curriculum but adds (as normal) more Islamic education and puts also a strong emphasis on art and music. We were informed that several contemporary exponents of liberal Islam and women's studies in Indonesia come from this pesantren. During the delegation's visit to Jombang, we visited several NU-pesantren. As explained by Lily Munir and experienced during our visit, pesantren are in many senses "family businesses" which has never been under the entire control of the authorities (although the pesantren are formally under the Ministry of Religious Affairs). In connection with our visit to the Sunan Ampel pesantren (which was founded by Lily Munir's father, Mahfudz Anwar), Lily Munir presented a plan for a "Pesantren Pluralism Project". The projects aims at strengthening international perspectives, interfaith openness and gender awareness in the educational programs of Sunan Ampel pesantren and Sunan Ampel formal junior high school. In Jombang, we also met with teachers at the al-Anwar pesantren which was founded by Mahfudz Anwar’s father who (in accordance with the NU custom) came to Jombang in order to establish a pesantren in a "virgin" area. Aimed at fighting social vices such as theft, prostitution, gambling and drinking, this and other pesantren were thought of not only as a base for traditional Islamic learning but also as a "civilising" project. Whereas the pesantren originally focused only on memorising the Qur’an and the Sunna, the students are now studying a wide array of sources such as classical works on fiqh and al-Ghazali's "Revival of the religious sciences". During our encounter with kiai Abdul Aziz Manshoer, he underlined that his pesantren "teach respect of all religions, as long as they don’t disturb each others. Disputes should be solved by dialogue, not violence. These are the basic teachings here; but it varies how they are interpreted." As for the general, educational vision, Abdul Aziz Manshoer emphasised that any kiai is supposed to be a 24 hours model for the students. But the ultimate goal is the full independence of the students. (The pesantren ideal is not to become a civil servant but rather to become an independent agent in civil society – preferably by taking upon oneself tasks within the pesantren system.) Asked about the role of civic education in the pesantren, the kiai responded that "civic education is good and necessary. In our religion, we teach akhlaq (ethics) which includes the virtues of tolerance and respect." Further emphasising that civic education is in full accordance with Islam, he cited a saying of caliph Umar: "The one who knows the language of a society will not be manipulated by it. Also secular education has thus a religious function." In the pesantren system, the kiai decides whether a particular pesantren shall be for both sexes or not. Visiting the Seblah pesantren for girls only, which was established in 1929 by Lily Munir's grandfather, we were impressed by well-informed questions put to the (panelled) delegation by the teenagers and their obvious gender awareness. In general, the visit to Jombang left the impression of a vivid interaction between "tradition and modernity" in the pesantren system. Conscious of the wide impact that pesantren have not only on the religious and civic formation of children but also as bases of higher Islamic learning, projects aimed at raising gender awareness and widening the international and interreligious outlook in pesantren institutions would seem to have an obvious strategic importance. As for current developments in Christian private schools, the delegation
was able to inform itself about recent changes in the way religion
is taught in Catholic schools in one of the dioceses of We were informed that before the introduction of the new subject, most Catholic schools did not offer Islamic education, although a few did offer it because of a high percentage of Muslim students and/or political pressure. With reference to the current debate on whether private schools should be obliged to offer multiple choices in religious education, we were informed that the bishop has stated that if parents ask for Islamic education, one should provide it. But no one has done so after the introduction of the new, inclusive subject. A basic recognition behind the new subject is that religion does not necessarily make people better human beings. It may just as well enhance tension and increase the distance. This must be countered by new and creative models of religious education which help the students to see that different religions have similar moral aims but different terms and means. The values approach is central and the students are challenged to try out the values which they identify together in small local projects. In this way, it is hoped that Pendidikan Religiositas may contribute towards "religious humanity" and prepare the students to be social change agents. According to our informant at the catechetical centre, religious and moral education in an inclusive form may help Christians, Muslims, Buddhists etc. to become better Christians, Muslims, Buddhists – by getting to know each other better and by doing things together to the benefit of the entire community.
7c Higher education and university co-operationDuring our stay, the delegation visited several
Muslim and Christian universities: Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic University
in As noted above, the State Institutes of Islamic Studies (IAIN)
has played a pivotal role in the development of Islamic thought
in IAIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta was founded
in 1957 and is now a full fledged university (UIN) with nine faculties
– including a Faculty of Theology (Fakultas Ushuluddin) which includes
a Department of Comparative Religion, a Faculty of Shari‘a (Fakultas
Syari‘ah) and a Centre for Women's Studies. The representatives
of the Centre for Women's Studies informed us that women's studies
is a steadily growing field of activitity
and research in As part of its theological activity, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah publishes the English/Indonesian journal Studia Islamika which – since its inception in 1994 – has been an important channel for studies in contextual and liberal Islam. In a meeting with rector Azyumardi Azra and several staff members from different faculties, it was explained that the vision of Syarif Hidayatullah was to integrate "Indonesianness, Islamness, and Humanity." Their overarching aim was described as producing tolerant graduates with a modern, "Islam rasional" outlook. It was emphasised that academic institutions cannot approach religion only from the normative point of view – historical, sociological, anthropological perspectives must be added. As mentioned above, Syarif Hidayatullah has also played an important role in developing a new program for Civic Education in schools and universities. We also had a meeting with rector
Amin Abdullah of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga in Many of their students at Sunan Kalijaga are involved
in interfaith activities. As an example of ongoing research in the
field of interreligious studies, it was mentioned that a PhD-student
is currently writing a dissertation on the difference between a
Protestant and Muslim atmosphere in dialogue, exemplified by the
work of Interfidei and Paramadina respectively. IAIN Sunan Kalijaga
often invites teachers from Protestant and Catholic universities,
and many of the students at Sunan Kalijaga make extensive use the
library of the Catholic university Sanata Dharma. Furthermore, IAIN
supports the new program of Comparative Religion at the prestigious
(state) With regard to gender issues, IAIN Sunan Kalijaga has a separate program for women’s studies in which the works of such scholars as Riffat Hassan, Amina Wadud and Fatima Mernissi are read. Gender issues are also integrated in all other subjects at Sunan Kalijaga. In a brief visit to the Centre for Women Studies, it turned out that the staff was busy with a conference on "Deconstruction of Gender". During a visit to |
