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Lena
Larsen (ed.)
Report from
The Oslo Coalition
Visit
to China
(21.03.
– 01.04.00)
Final
version
|
1. Introduction
2.
Purpose of the visit
3.
Questions of methodology
3.1
Figures
4.
The programme for the visit
5.
Legal standards
5.1
The international conventions and declarations
5.2
The Chinese juridical situation
6.
Religious policies in the People's Republic of China
6.1
SARA
7.
Religions
7.1
Taoism
7.1.1
General remarks
7.1.2
Number of adherents
7.1.3
The delegation's impressions
7.1.4
Problems associated with Taoism
7.2
Buddhism
7.2.1
In general
7.2.2
Religious education
7.2.3
Recruiting
7.2.4
Education for children
7.2.5
Social work
7.2.6
Mission
7.2.7
Pilgrimage
7.2.8
Popular religion/superstitition
7.2.9
Economy/financing
7.2.10
The re-allocation of religious properties
7.2.11
Impression
7.3
Islam
7.3.1
General remarks
7.3.2
Organisation
7.3.3
Education
7.3.4
Education and children
7.3.5
Recruiting
7.3.6
Pilgrimage
7.3.7
Religious expressions in the public sphere
7.3.8
Religious literature
7.3.9
Mosques
7.3.10
Burial grounds
7.3.11
Conclusion
7.4
Catholicism
7.4.1
General remarks
7.4.2
Figures, recruiting
7.4.3
Organisation
7.4.4
Financing
7.4.5
The growth of the church
7.4.6
Priest/order persons
7.4.7
Religious education/other education in church regime
7.4.8
Religious literature
7.4.9
Practice/ritual activities
7.4.10
Summary
7.5
Protestantism
7.5.1
General remarks
7.5.2
Organisation
7.5.3
Activity
7.5.4
Religion and children
7.5.5
Protestantism in the public sphere
8.
Conclusions
8.1
The most important problems
8.1.1
Organising religion
8.1.2
The authorities' meddling in internal affairs
8.1.3
Religion in the public sphere
8.1.4
Parents' rights, religious education and children's practise
8.1.5
Reallocation of religious property
8.1.6
Equal treatment of religious/non-religious ones
8.2
Observations
8.3
Some positive features
9.
The delegation's recommendations
10.
Appendix
10.1
List of places and institutions visited
10.2
Bibliography
10.3
Web sites
A delegation from The Oslo coalition on freedom
of religion or belief visited China from 21 March till 1 April 2000.
The delegation consisted of Lena Larsen, Egil Lothe, Tove Beate
Pedersen, Einar Vetvik, Kari Vogt and Koen Wellens. The delegation
members represented four of the five official religious communities
that are officially recognized in China, while Tove Beate Pedersen
represented the Norwegian Humanist Association. (The professional
backgrounds of these are three historians of religion, one a psychologist,
one a political scientist and one a sinologist.) From the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr Janis B. Kanavin, a special adviser
for Human Rights, and Mr Lasse Bjørn Johannessen, Senior
Executive Officer at the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing, participated.
Mr Kanavin was the leader of the delegation during the visit to
Beijing, while Mr Vetvik, chair of the board of the Oslo Coalition,
was in charge during the rest of the visit.
The host in China was the State Administration
for Religious Affairs (SARA). The SARA had planned the programme
for the delegation in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Embassy in Beijing. The delegation
visited five cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Fuzhou, Quanzhou and Xiamen.
In each city the delegation was received by the local SARA representatives
and representatives from different recognized religious communities. The meetings with religious
representatives meant visits to churches, temples, mosques, seminars
for the education of priests, monks etc. plus a visit to a cemetary
in Fouzhou. In Beijing the delegation visited the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences (CASS), the Department for Religious Studies. In Shanghai we visited
a prominent representative for the Shanghai Women's Federation.
This report is written at the request of the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ms Lena Larsen has had the main responsibility
for the chapter about Islam, Mr Egil Lothe for the chapter about
Buddhism and Taoism, Mr Einar Vetvik for Protestantism and Ms Kari
Vogt about the Catholic Church. However, as a whole the report is
a cooperative work and the result of the entire delegation's work
and opinions. The report is edited by Ms Lena Larsen and Mr Einar
Vetvik. Please note that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
is not responsible for the content of the report.
On the background of the Oslo declaration the
Oslo coalition is to work out a strategic plan of action for practical
support for the implementation of the standards of international
human rights concerningr freedom of religion or belief. An important
step in this process is to establish contact and dialogue with different
relevant groups and institutions in other countries. This was an
important aim for the delegation in its visit to China.
The purpose was also to study the conditions for
freedom of religion or belief, the possibilities and limitations
in the People's Republic of China, including the legal limits, how
the law is enforced; furthermore, whether the limitations are self-imposed
or the result of the authorities' policy and legislation. The delegation
chose to focus on the situation of the average Chinese regarding
the freedom of religion or belief.
The report is based on interviews, observations
and written material handed out during the visit to China, and available
open sources about religion and the freedom of religion or belief
in China. The instruments of the international human rights (see
chapter about legal norms) were the basis for our work. Religious
practice will vary according to the religion's distinctive character,
tradition and local circumstances. An important way of looking at
this is to compare religious practices in China with the common
practices of the same religions in other countries.
The delegation was aware of the fact that it is
not possible to get a comprehensive picture during a short visit.
Accordingly, the goal was, based on the experiences from the visit,
to get an idea of the themes/areas that the coalition can continue
to work on.
In all the five cities we visited we first had
a meeting with the representatives for the SARA, whereupon they
took us around to various religious communities. In every place
we visited the delegation raised important questions regarding the
practice of freedom of religion or belief. The interviews were conducted
with the help of an interpreter in the presence of representatives
from the central and local SARA. This may have influenced the answers
given to the delegation. Therefore, an important task has been to
interpret the answers. One problem may have been that we were probably
too pushy in relation to the religious representatives, and too
polite regarding the official representatives that was our real
dialogue partner. In many cases the visits did not allow for much
time to ask questions, and in some cases only inspections of religious
localities took place. “Incidental” questions from the
delegation could, however, touch upon interesting topics.
The delegation's visit was limited to visits and
talks with the authorities and prominent persons from the officially
recognized national and local religious communities.
The authorities' use of figures is rather arbitrary.
Sometimes (such as in a meeting with the leader of the SARA, Mr
Ye Xiaowen) we were told that China had a total of one hundred million
believers. In other connections a couple of hundred million was
mentioned.
The fact that the authorities define the majority
of the population as non-believers, may be interpreted as a normative
statement as much as a descriptive one. Representatives from the
Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing referred to surveys which
showed that only four per cent of Beijing's population could be
characterised as believers. The number of convinced atheists was,
however, rather small. The majority of the population belonged somewhere
“in between religion and non-religion".
The same uncertainty exits regarding followers
of the different religions.
The delegation met selected representatives from
the SARA, representatives from the various religious communities
and researchers from the CASS. By means of questions we tried to
get information about each religious communitiy. We had also the
possibility to make our own observations through visits to various
religious premises as well as a Catholic cemetary. There were also
opportunities for more informal observations of religious expressions
and activities, but to a lesser degree than we would have preferred.
The choices of religious communities were made
by the Chinese. Accordingly we got a picture of what the Chinese
wanted to show us, and what they felt was relevant regarding the
practice of freedom of religion or belief.
Taoism and Islam were clearly less represented
on the list of visits to the religious communities. Regarding Islam
the delegation had, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, specifically
expressed a desire for more meetings with Muslims than listed in
the preliminary programme that the delegation had received before
leaving for China, but no changes were made. In addition to talks
with Haji Hillaluddin Chen Guangyuan, the president of the China
Islamic Association, and Haij Abdola Huang Qiurun, the president
of the Islam Association in the Fujian province, the meeting with
Muslims included only one visit to the Niujie mosque in Beijing
– and to the Qingjing in Quanzhou that appeared as a sort
of a museum. The delegation did not get the opportunity to attend
any Islamic activities (Friday prayer, female activities, distribution
and printing of Islamic publications etc.)
The delegation's meetings with the Catholic Church
were also more limited than preferred from our side. We had only
two meetings with the opportunity for conversations, with Bishop
Fu Tieshan, the leader of the Catholic Patriotic Church in China,
in Beijing, and with Chancellor J. Berchmans Sheng and a group of
active non-professional (women) in Shanghai. In addition there were
three short visits to Catholic church buildings in Beijing, Shanghai
and Fuzhou and a visit to the Catholic cemetery in Fuzhou. The delegation
did not get a chance to observe any Catholic activities (charitable
work, printing or distribution centres for religious publications
etc.), in spite of the fact that such activities are said to be
quite extensive in Beijing and Shanghai.
Accordingly, the delegation did not get a complete
picture of the Catholic Patriotic Church, and there were no possibilities
for meeting representatives for the underground church.
The Protestant churches and their religious activities
were far better covered. The reason may have been that the Chinese
thought we were first and foremost interested in Protestant churches,
something that was expressed in the departure meeting in Beijing
by Guo Wei, Vice President of the Department of Foreign Affairs
in the SARA. The reasons may have been more complex.
The list of Buddhist institutions showed a predominance
of central institutions, such as schools for monks and nuns, and
to a lesser degree ordinary small temples. The selection was understandable,
considering the limited time of the delegation. The extent and types
of religious life for ordinary people were less focused upon.
5.1 The international conventions and declarations
The World Declaration of Human rights (1948),
article 18 and the UN convention on civil and political rights,
the CCPR (1966), article 18, are the basis for the principle of
freedom of religion or belief. These instruments determine that
all human beings have the right to freedom of religion or belief,
whether alone or in a society with others, privately or publicly.
This includes the right to practise religion or belief through services,
observance of religious customs, prayers and education. This freedom
can only be subject to limitations that are laid down by laws and
that are necessary in order to protect public safety, order, health
and moral or other fundamental rights and freedom. Parents and guardians
are secured the right to offer their children religious and moral
education according to their own convictions.
The UN's declaration of the abolishment of all
types of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief
(1981) is not formally binding in the same way as a convention,
but makes the principles in the CCPR more specific. According to
the Declaration's article 1 the following includes the right to
freedom of religion or belief:
(a) To worship or assemble in connexion with
a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these
purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian
institutions; (c)
To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles
and materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To
write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To
teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To
solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions
from individuals and institutions; (g)
To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate
leaders called for by the requirements and standards of any religion
or belief; (h)
To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies
in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
(i) To
establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities
in matters of religion or belief at the national and international
levels.
Since the freedom of religion or belief clearly
encompasses a collective aspect, the right to meet for religious
activities and the right to organise, must be seen in connection
with the CCPR article 21 about the right to peaceful gatherings,
and article 22 about the right to freedom of assembly and to freedom
of expression.
The regulations in the international instruments
for human rights are the reference background for the delegation's
description and discussion of religious activity and its limits.
There are several documents in China that emphasise
the official Chinese interpretation of freedom of religion or belief.
The basis is article 36 in the constitution that says that the citizens
of the People's Republic of China have the freedom of religion:
No official agency, public organisation or single person can force
anybody to believe or not believe in any particular religion. The
State protects what is called normal religious activity, and nobody
can use religion to disturb public order, hurt people's health or
interfere with public education. In the regulation from the Chinese
Communist party Basic interpretation and politics related to
religious questions in the socialistic period in our country from 1982, the so-called document 19, the question about the cultural
revolution is settled and it is laid down that it would be unfortunate
to suppress religion in a violent way or through administrative
rules. This liberalisation led to an upsurge of religion and of
demands for greater autonomy for ethnic groups such as the Tibetans
in Tibet and the Muslims in Xinjiang.
However, since 1994 a tightening up by the authorities
has taken place. Two regulations came in 1994, document 144 and
145. In these documents the contact with foreigners was limited,
and it was required to register all religious activities. In 1996
it was further required that patriotism should be emphasised in
all religious activities.
The national minorities' religions are in principle
protected under the law of autonomy. This takes precedence over
the law of freedom of religion. Agreement with or deviations from
international conventions and the Chinese interpretation will be
discussed later.
China has recently signed the UN convention about
civil and political rights (1966). Work is presently going on in
order to get it ratified by China. Since the ratification means
an examination of Chinese law in relation to the convention's standards,
this may have a positive effect on the situation regarding questions
about religion or belief in China.
The People's Republic of China was founded in
1949 with the Communist Party in power. Through the realisation
of socialism with Chinese characteristics the need for religion
is assumed to disappear, and all religious faith and practise will
become extinct. Until then religion is tolerated as long as it contributes
to unity, strength, production, modernisation and socialisation,
i.e. serves the interest of the State. Five religious communities
were approved of. The radicalisation during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76) resulted, however, in all religious practices being considered
contra-revolutionary, and therefore forbidden. These policies were
considerably corrected in the beginning of the 80s. Even though
the Party was still sceptical regarding religious practice, it counted
on religions playing only a marginal role in a modern, Chinese society.
However, this proved to be wrong: religions have thrived very much
towards the middle of the 90s.
Each of the recognized religious communities has
a patriotic organisation as a link between the religious communities
and the authorities. The leaders of the patriotic, religious communities
cooperate closely with the State Agency for Religious Affairs, SARA,
which, on behalf of the authorities regulates the relation between
religions, society and the State.
The SARA plays a central role in the State's religious
policy. The organisation defines its role in relation to the supreme
goal for Chinese policy: Economic development and social stability.
According to the President of the SARA, Ye Xiaowen, China has made
great progress towards human rights and rule of the law. He expressed,
however, that they are willing to do more, but stated that the development
should not proceed too rapidly since attention always had to be
paid to supreme, political goals. ("More haste, more waste",
was how he expressed himself).
The representatives from the SARA reported that
it was not the State's goal to supress religion, since Chinese policy
today is to let the religions exist and develop in accordance with
the law of freedom of religion. Religions may contribute positively
towards the society's development, but it was explicitly said that
religions are expected to adjust to society and "social reality".
(In Fuzhou the leader for the SARA said that there was agreement
between the government and the religious communities regarding adjustments
to the socialistic system).
The state will fight feudal superstition and cults
that suppress people. In addition it is the SARA's task for instance
to correct and educate (especially people that are conducting religious
activities outside the defined, religious sections). However, it
was strongly emphasised that the SARA saw as its task to monitor
the work for freedom of religion such as it is laid down in the
constitution, and by this try to make up for the suppression and
infringement that took place during the Cultural Revolution. The
SARA is not to meddle in the internal affairs of the various religious,
such as appointments of bishops, but only be concerned with the
relations between the religious communities and the state. The SARA
representatives also emphasised that the SARA has also contributed
to defend the rights and ensure less discrimination of religious
groups since they constitute minorities.
Both parties stressed the good relationship between
the SARA and the leaders of the religious communities. It was said
that their common goal was to implement freedom of religion. (The
interpretation of freedom of religion was not defined, but we understood
it was something they agreed upon). Many religious leaders also
expressed the opinion that the SARA ought to be thanked for the
fact the relationship between the religions was now was very good,
and that their religions now enjoyed better conditions than they
had ever had in Chinese history. (Their references were all their
own history, and not other countries today). The SARA is to contribute
to "the three self-principles" on state, regional and
local level. The three principles are: 1) Self-support, 2) Self-management
and 3) Self-propagation. These principles were explained and argued
for in many of the delegation's meetings with the SARA on different
levels.
When questioned about how the SARA interpreted
the recent increasing interest for religions, the answer was that
this was a result of the democratic development and the opening-up
policy. This was looked upon as a normal process. The Chinese State
had thought that a modern Chinese society would have less need for
religion, and that a weakening of religious organising would be
the result. This has not happened. Instead, paradoxically, it looks
as if the State's own policy has contributed to the strengthening
of the position of religions and their development in the Chinese
society.
The traditional popular religion of the Han-Chinese
has as its basis the family and emphasises ritual practices consisting
of sacrifices to the ancestors as well as to deceased family members.
Some of these ancestors may reach a status that goes beyond the
clan or the village to the extent that they are worshipped as local
deities. These deities may be worshipped in separate temples or
in Taoist or Buddhist temples. There are various rituals and practices
related to the cult of the ancestors such as divination, feng shui
(wind and water, "the doctrine about adjustment to landscape
and surroundings"), spiritism, etc. The Chinese Communists
have traditionally been very sceptical to these popular beliefs,
not the least because they place the individual's primary loyalty
to the family and the clan, and not to the Party. At the same time
divination and other related practices fit badly into a Marxist
worldview. While suppression of the great world religions might
result in troubles regarding China's relation to other countries,
the prohibition of traditional religious practices has not been
considered equally problematic.
Taoism differs from the other recognized religions
in China by having been limited throughout history to China and
the Han-Chinese population (even if elements of Taoism philosophy/religion
exist among other East-Asian peoples). The concept of Taoism has
otherwise a variety of meanings as it is used as a term for specific
religious movements as well as a label for a more general popular
Chinese religion/ belief.
In official Chinese language today Taoism refers
to institutionalised religious traditions that date back to the
second century AD. Two main movements are assumed: Quanzhen which
is a contemplative movement with ordained monks who live in monastic
communities, and Zhengyi, which mainly emphasises the cult of deities
as well as various activities for the laity. Quanzhen is centred
in North-China whereas Zhengyi dominates in the South.
In 1957 an official organisation for Taoism was
established: The Taoist Association of China.
Since Taoism covers such a broad spectrum of traditions
and types of belief, it has been subject to the authorities' campaigns
against so-called superstition after 1949. On the other hand the
connection to popular traditions associated with village communities
seems to have given Taoist traditions a certain resilience against
the authorities' restrictive religious policies.
The authorities seem to have an ambivalent relation
to Taoism: Negative regarding the outlook on Taoism as superstition
and a faith difficult to controll. Positive regarding the role of
Taoism as an expression of ancient Chinese culture. This point of
view is emphasized by the fact that classical Taoist texts have
been published by official authorities.
7.1.2 Number
of adherents
According to official figures there are more than
25 000 Taoist priest and nuns in more than 1500 Taoist temples.
The leader for the Taoist Association of China reported in 1997
that there were about 15 000 monks/nuns living in temples/monasteries
(belonging to Quanzhen) while priests (belonging to Zhengyi) that
lives at home with their families accounted for 40- 50 000. Regarding the figure for Taoist temples
the leader separated between temples that are open with the authorities'
approval (about 1700) and so-called "activity spots”
which make up a considerably larger number.
The authorities have not quantified the number
of Taoists. This has to do with the fact that the term itself is
not particularly clear when applied to the laity. The leader of
the Taoist Association of China claims that more than one hundred
million persons in China believe in Taoism.
The delegation visited two Taoist temples: the
Baiyun temple in Beijing and the Yuan Miao temple in Quanzhou. In
addition two of the delegation's members visited the Chenhuang temple
in Shanghai. In the Baiyun temple the delegation met one of the
leaders of the Taoist Association of China. He told that 60 monks
lived in the temple and that they studied at the college of temple
(one of three in China). In general these places gave the impression
of being dynamic religious places. The temples in Shanghai and Quanzhou
were completely renovated: the Chenghuang temple was handed back
to the Taoists in 1997, whereas the Yuan Miao temple was rebuilt
in the spring of 2000. Furthermore a representative from the Taoist
Association of China informed us that an increasing number of young
people joined the Taoist temples.
Taoism is clearly marked by the authorities' persecution
that started already in the 1950s with a number of priests and temples
being reduced. The lack of tolerance on the authorities' part for
expression of belief that they define as "superstition"
is a continuous problem because Chinese popular are so closely interwoven
with Taoism.
The destruction and confiscation of temples in
the period 1949-1976 means that the re-allocation of religious properties
to the Taoists is important. A problem in this connection is the
authorities' use of Taoist temples as museums and tourist attractions.
Lack of legal protection connected to the practice
of popular Taoism is a problem that is pointed out by experts on
Taoism in today's China. In his studies of Taoism in Fujian, Kenneth
Dean has documented to which degree Taoism thrives in the rural areas while
being subject to interference by the authorities who tear down temples
that are built without permission. He also points to arrests for
activities that have previously been accepted.
Buddhism in China has a history of about 2000
years (the official 2000 years jubilee was marked in 1998). Even
though Buddhism was originally an Indian religion it has throughout
its history been sinicised in such a way that it is perceived today
as a Chinese religion. In Han-Chinese areas the population has traditionally
had a loose relation to Buddhist religious institutions (temples
and monasteries). The fact that Buddhism has existed along with
the doctrinal system of Confucianism and the religion of Taoism
may be interpreted as a peculiar form of religious pluralism. In
this connection it is interesting to notice that people are connected
to more than one religion. This situation means that it is the presence
of Buddhist religious elements which indicates the strength of Buddhism.
The mere number of Buddhists tells less about the situation of the
religion. The number of monks, nuns and lay disciples as well as
the number of temples and monasteries (which are quantifiable data)
are clear indicators of the presence and the strength of Buddhism
in Chinese society. Due to the central role of the monasteries,
the quality of the monasteries regarding the level of education,
liturgic and contemplative practice etc., is an important indicator
of the situation of Buddhism.
Even though Buddhism in China is unified in one
organisation (the Chinese Buddhist Association), there are actually
three traditions associated with various ethnic groups.
Theravada , which is otherwise widespread in South-East Asia, exists among minority
groups such as Dai, Bulang, De'ang, Va and Alu in the border district of Burma and Laos and number about 1.5 million.
According to official information there are about 10 000 monks and
novices in 1600 monasteries.
Tibetan Buddhism (Tantric Mahayana) exists among Tibetans, Mongols, Tu, Yugu, Pumi,
Monba and Loba which together make up a population of about 7 million.
According to official figures the number of monks and nuns is 120
000 in 3 000 monasteries.
Chinese Buddhism (Mahayana) exists among Han-Chinese. Looking at official figures which
report of a total number of 200 000 monks and nuns and more than
13 000 monasteries, there should be more than 8000 monasteries and
70 000 monks and nuns among the Han-Chinese. Besides, it is reported
that there are "at least 40 000 monks and nuns" and "more
than 5 000 monasteries”.
The proportion of the Han-Chinese population that
may be considered as Buddhist is therefore decided by the definition
used as well as by the documentation available. When the authorities
use figures, they normally refer to lay disciples (persons who have
taken certain religious vows) so that these figures do not indicate
much about the full picture regarding the population’s adherence
to Buddhism.
When, for instance, the authorities in the Fujian
province (with a population of 32 million) talk about 120 000 "Buddhists"
in the province (in addition to 12 000 monks and nuns) this refers
to such lay disciples. Regarding the number of Buddhists today,
the leaders of the official Buddhist community (the Chinese Buddhist
Association) talk about 300 million people being "influenced
by Buddhism".
Regarding Buddhism (and Taoism) the border between
belief and non-belief is blurred by the fact that aspects of Buddhism
are perceived as a elements of Chinese culture. The status of Buddhism'
as a part of Chinese culture is evident through the fact that classic
texts from this religion are published by the authorities. One example
is the publishing by the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing of
the entire Chinese Buddhist Canon which can also be purchased in
public bookstores. This is also the case with the Taoist Scriptures,
in contrast to what seems to be the case with the scriptures of
the other religions.
We visited five monasteries with schools for the
education of monks and nuns in, Beijing (1), Shanghai (2), Fuzhou
(1) and Xiamen (1). The highest level of education (up to seven
years) is found at the Fa Yuan monastery which has 120 students
today. Furthermore, we were informed that the students in the Nan
Putuo monastery in Xiamen are given the opportunity to study at
the Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing (as external students)
after completion of their studies at the monastery. Although we
did not get the opportunity to look more closely at the curriculum
and to observe the teaching in classes, we got the impression that
these were institutions of a high standard. In several places the
premises had been expanded and modernised with facilities for computer
training.
Regarding recruitment we were told that the monks
in the Fa Yuan monastery mainly came from the upper socio-economic
strata of the population.
From the abbot Jing Hui from the Bailin monastery
outside Beijing and from the Nan Putuo monastery in Xiamen we received
VCDs about, among other things, the educational activities in these
monasteries, which appeared to follow the classical patterns for
such education (see Welch 1967 and Prip-Møller 1937).
We were also told that during weekends lay Buddhists
were invited to participate in classes. Since 1980 28 students from
this monastery had been sent to studies abroad.
At the delegation's meeting with the Chinese Buddhist
Association (CBA) in the Guangji monastery in Beijing we were told
by its Vice President Ven. Jing Hui that about 3 000 new monks and nuns were ordained every year
in China. This information seemed to be in accordance with our own
observations, since we noticed only a small number of elderly monks
and nuns the monasteries we visited , while a great number were
young (20-30 years old). Furthermore, the generation which came
into adulthood during the period of the cultural revolution (now
aged 40-50 years) was mostly absent. (We noticed this also regarding
the other religions).
Previously the Buddhists did not teach children
and young people in their temples (with the exception of novices)
However, today some temples teach young people. In the Bailin monastery
where the above mentioned Ven. Jing Hui is the abbot, major gatherings
for young people are arranged. These gatherings were mentioned by
the abbot in the meeting with the delegation, and were also presented
in greath length in the monastery's VCD. This activity seemed to
be inspired by similar developments among the Chinese outside China
where such training has become relatively common (Taiwan, Singapore
and the USA). However, we did not see any indications of organized
education of children.
Like other religious communities, Buddhists are
offering aid in connection with natural catastrophes (flood etc.)
The Nan Puoto monastery in Xiamen gives in its VCD an extensive
presentation of its social centre, which as one of its activities,
is engaged in humanitarian aid and medical help (nuns who offer
medical help). A written publication from the Kaiyuan monastery
in Quanzhou mentions the donation of a new school for children to
a local community outside the city.
Buddhism is to a lesser degree than Christianity
and Islam oriented toward mission. There are, however, various activities
directed toward the population such as the education of the laity
about Buddhism in the temples, which we were given the opportunity
to observe. We were told that such education took place in Beijing
and Shanghai. The monasteries have also stores that sell books and
religious paraphernalia for home altars etc. Besides,
cassettes and VCD are also sold here. Obviously VCDs were a popular
medium that passed on Buddhist songs and prayers in karaoke form
for private study at home. The Buddhists also used the Internet.
The Internet pages are also linked to the home pages of the Chinese
Buddhist institutions abroad, and obviously function as a channel
for mutual communication between Chinese Buddhists. The Buddhists'
main periodical Fa Yin is for instance
published electronically. Ye Xiaowen at the SARA in Beijing told
us that he was positive to this development.
Pilgrimages to famous monasteries and especially
to the holy mountains Puto Shan, Jiuhua Sahn, Wutai Shan and Emei
Shan take place extensively and do not seem to be problematic. This
kind of activity may turn out to become mere tourism, which makes
participation unproblematic. The extent of this may be rather problematic
by making the holy places into tourist sites. The authorities seem
to have become aware of the commercial possibilities of this activity
and have for instance installed aerial cableways and Buddhist "theme
parks" etc.
Certain forms of popular religion / belief are
defined as "superstition". The authorities' practice seems,
however, to vary according to local conditions. In Shanghai and
in the Fujian province the climate seemed to be relatively tolerant
regarding this (the use of divination pieces in temples and the
burning of symbolic money etc.). The Academy of Social Sciences
in Beijing reported the practice of mediums (a folk religious practice
also involving a few Buddhists) is forbidden. Studies conducted
in the Fujian province indicate, however, that such practices are
considerably widespread in the rural areas. At the same time it
is reported that the authorities occasionally interfere. It is also
reported that the authorities in connection with such campaigns
tear down and close a great number of popular religious temples.
When we inquired about this, it was denied by the SARA's leader
in Quanzhou. Many things indicate that this needs to be further
investigated.
It appeared that a considerable economic support
was received from Chinese Buddhist outside the People's Republic.
In a publication it was reported that the Fa Yuan monastery school
in Beijing has been financed by Buddhists in Hong Kong. In Fujian,
which is the home province for many Chinese from abroad, this support
is extensive.
In the Nan Putou monastery with 560 monks and
140 laymen we were told that the economy was based on the income
from:
1. Donations from about 3 million visitors to the monastery every
year.
2. Income from tickets which amounts to about 6 000 000 yuan every
year.
3. The management of a vegetarian restaurant which has a sale of
10 000 000 every year.
Furthermore it was clear that in Shanghai there
was also income from the rental of properties. Otherwise several
of the monasteries we visited had vegetarian restaurants, which
probably resulted in a considerable income.
Regarding the re-allocation of temples and monasteries,
we were informed by Ye Xiaowen that this depended on the number
of monks/nuns. Taking into consideration that the monasteries were
secularised in the early 1950s, and that a large part of the Buddhist
clergy has been lost, this argument may have a certain validity.
Abbot Jing Hui from the CBA reported that the authorities followed
a principle stating that 300 lay Buddhists had to request a re-allocation
of a temple, and that there had to be at least four monks or nuns
to take responsibility for the temple.
The SARA's leader in Shanghai reported that there
are more monks in each temple today than previously. The statistical
data reported above confirm this. Concerning the progress of the
re-allocation of religious property in general we received somewhat
conflicting pieces of information. Regarding Beijing, the protestant
leader in the Chongwenmen church gave the impression that this had
not progressed too well. According to Ven. Jing Hui the number of
Buddhist temples with monks and nuns in Beijing was 11 (against
about 500 in the 1930s). Regarding Shanghai we were informed that
the properties belonging to the various religions were rented out
and gave a considerable income to the religious communities for
investments and management. The Buddhists were reported to be the
richest of the religious communities.
Our impression is that Han-Chinese Buddhism is
less controversial for the Chinese authorities than what is the
case with several of the other religions (However, this is not the
case for Tibetan Buddhism which we did not study during our visit).
The general limitations that apply for the religious life in China
are still in force for Buddhists (education of children, manifestations
in the public sphere, access to places for religious activities,
re-allocation of religious buildings etc.). Regarding the dialogue
on religious freedom between Western countries and China there are
two weaknesses that should be mentioned: Firstly, very little focus
has been put on Chinese Buddhism in spite of the fact that it is
the largest religion in China. Secondly, regarding Buddhism, one
has not distinguished clearly between Buddhism among Han-Chinese
and Tibetan Buddhism among Tibetans and other minority groups.
It is therefore important to focus on Chinese
Buddhism in order to get a broader and more representative picture
of Chinese religious policies and the religious situation in China.
In this connection it would be valuable to follow
up the direct contact with Chinese Buddhism in order to base further
dialogues with the Chinese authorities on the most broad and realistic
understanding of the religious situation in China. Furthermore,
increased research in this area will be important for further dialogues
about these questions. Such research should therefore be stimulated.
Islamic tradition says that a missionary delegation
lead by the prophet Muhammad' s uncle Sa'ad ibn Abi Waqqas in was
sent to the Chinese emperor in 650 AD. The
delegation had China's first mosque built in Quanzhou in the Fujian
province. The next six hundred years the Arabic and the Persian
Muslims played an important role in the economy of China, especially
along the Silk Road in the north-west and in the sea ports in the
south-east. According to the historian Michael Dillon the Muslim
descendants of the Arabs and the Persians on the south-east coast
of China had a local and limited significance for Chinese Muslims
in contrast to the mass immigration from Central Asia during the
Mongol rule. The places we visited
were therefore not representative for Islam in China.
According to official figures there are 18 million
Muslims today, spread among ten ethnic minorities. Hui, Uigur and
Kazakh make up the majority. Traditionally they
have lived together in a large number of local communities gathered
around a central mosque either in isolated villages or in cities
(according to official figures there are today 30 000 mosques and
40 000 imams). The largest Muslim groups live in the north-west
of China, where they make up half of the population, in Beijing
they make up a small majority.
Muslims in China are a heterogeneous group, divided
according to ethnicity, language and religious tradition. This has
influenced their perception of their own identity and outlook on
the relationship to other Muslim groups and the Chinese State. Within
each of these groups we find many sub-groups – each with its
historical experience, religious tradition and identity. Regarding
Islam in China we find three main tendencies: The Muslims in China
are to a great degree Sunni-Muslims, and belong to the Hanafi legal
school ("traditional" Islam). Sufism gained influence
among Chinese Muslims in the late1600, and today there are a number
of Sufi orders represented in China, of which the largest are Naqshbaniyah,
Qadiriyah and Kubrawiyah. From late in the 1800s wahhabi-inspired
reformed movements have also arisen, known as Yihewani (from Arabic
ikhwan, "brothers"). It
is typical for these movements to be critical of traditional Islam,
which they regard as too mixed with Chinese culture and Sufism,
which they consider to be too closely connected to burial cults
and holy persons.
The state approved China Islamic Association was
founded in 1953, and is organised on three levels: national, provincial,
and local. On asking questions in the Niujie mosque if the mosque
had any contact with Uighurs in Xinjiang we were told that contact
existed between the different sections of the China Islamic Association,
but not between the mosques. It looks as if each mosque first and
foremost has contact with the local unit of the China Islamic Association,
which contributes to the implementation of the government's religious
policies. We assume that there is a close connection between the
China Islamic Association and the Chinese political leadership,
since Haji Hilaluddin is also a member of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference.
Both the state approved China Islamic Association
and the local Muslim groups emphasise the importance of contact
with foreign countries. The Chinese authorities have economic and
political contacts with the Muslim world, and it is claimed that
a renaissance has taken place regarding studies of Islamic culture
in China since 1979. China
has diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, which still has diplomatic
relations with Taiwan as well. The contact with foreign countries
is also evident in the field of Islamic education. Women as well
as men travel abroad to study in Islamic countries. Haji Hilaluddin,
the president of the China Islamic Association and Adil Haj Kerim,
the vice president of the international division in the same organisation,
had both Islamic education from Arabic countries and spoke Arabic
fluently. Still another sign of contact with foreign countries were
the different editions of the Koran exhibited in glass display cases
in the guesthouse in the Niujie mosque. Different editions in English
and Arabic published in Saudi Arabia were easily recognisable.
Education of religious specialists takes place
on four different levels: First through guidance by the local
ahong (imam); then through teaching
in classes in the mosque schools – also by the local imam.
The next level is at Islamic educational institution at the province
level, of which there are ten in China. The final stage is at the
Beijing Islamic Institute, located in Beijing, which represents
the national level. This institution is led by Haji Hilaluddin with
whom we had a brief conversation. The delegation did not study any
part of the curriculum, but there is reason to believe that the
policies of the Chinese State are included.
During our visit we repeatedly asked about education
of children, i.e. the teaching of the Koran. Everybody that was
asked answered that "parents educate their children at home,
this is a hundred-year old tradition in China". Possibly there
are special books for children that are used for this purpose. It
was confirmed in Quanzhou that no formal education for children
in the mosques exists.
Islam as a religion is centred on the Koran. Knowledge
about the Koran as guidance and as basis for the ritual prayers
is accordingly a prerequisite; the teaching of the Koran is therefore
central. This starts with teaching the children to recite, then
to read and, if possible, to learn the Koran by heart. (A minimum
of learning by heart is required in order to carry out the ritual
prayers). Therefore, we can find Koran schools in one form or another
all over the world. It
seems strange that the Chinese do not have Koran schools as part
of their tradition. We also know that there exists an Islamic movement
with branches in China, which has the education of children as its
purpose. Lack of education of children has grave consequences for
Muslims, and must be considered as a serious limitation of their
religious freedom.
Evidently no missionary activities for non-Muslims
takes place. Concerning recruitment, the president of the CIA mentioned
that about ten Han Chinese (men) converted annually in order to
marry a Muslim woman.
Each year 2000 Muslims travel on Hajj. The Chinese
authorities point to this as an example of the good conditions for
the freedom of religion or belief in China. Haji Hilaluddin had
himself just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca where he had led
the Chinese group. It is still pertinent to ask whether the freedom
of religion or belief has been fully implemented through its practical
organisation. It is known it is organised through the China Islamic
Association, and probably controlled by the Chinese authorities.
Furthermore,it is interesting to consider the number of pilgrims
in the perspective of freedom of religion or belief. About two million
pilgrims assemble in Mecca every year for the Hajj rituals. The
number of pilgrims from each country is determined by Saudi Arabia
that decides the quota from each country. Based on the fact that
there are about 18 million Muslims in China, the figure 2 000 seems
rather low compared to a normal quota for a population of this size.
It is not allowed to call to prayer from the minaret
in the individual mosque. This seems to be a practice established
after 1949. Adhan (call to prayer)
was established already in the first year after Hijra, and is a
central Islamic practice that is protected by the recognized universal
standards, and should therefore be allowed in China as well.
The delegation did not see much of the printing
and publishing of Islamic literature. The China Islamic Association
publishes a periodical Zongguo Musilin with
six editions annually, and with 10 000 issues in Chinese and 30
000 in Uighur. The periodical presents traditional Islamic subjects
as well as topics that may be regarded as expositions of Chinese
policies. Book reviews in the Zongguo Musilin may
indicate that literature published with the authorities' approval
belongs to two categories: Publications about Islamic culture and
Muslim history in China and abroad, published by the CASS, and classical
religious literature such as the Koran and Hadith published by the
CIA. We saw examples of Hadith in Chinese in the mosque in Quanzhou.
The Koran in Chinese; Arabic commentaries and classical books about
worship are sold in state bookstores in Ninxia, Gansu and Beijing,
according to observations by Dillon.
The Niujie mosque is said to be 1 004 years old.
It is built in traditional Chinese style, and accommodates 1 000
persons. In 1990 a prayer room for women was built in the north-eastern
corner of the premises to a price of 180 000 RMB and is estimated
to accommodate about 100 persons.
The Niuije mosque is regarded as being the official
Islam's face outwards, and receives Muslim guests from abroad. The
Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia donated US$ 230 000 to cover the area
with stone slabs. We visited the mosque during the Friday prayers
and observed that it was filled to capacity. It was the same with
the women's prayer rooms as well.
The Qingiing mosque in Quanzhou was built in 1009
in Damascus style. It was declared a Chinese cultural monument in
1961. The mosque itself is only an open area covered with grass.
The mosque room that now is being used is bear the mark of scarce
resources. We saw a model of a mosque that is planned built on the
premises, but financing is lacking.
The Muslims in Shanghai have flourishing religious
activities, including a mosque for women, the Little Peach Garden
mosque. The delegation learned that the mosque was built by women
with female financial support, because they were not admitted to
the men's mosque. We had no chance to investigate this. The reason
given was that it was too short notice to organize a visit to this
place as the Muslims sorted under The Bureau for Ethnic Minorities,
and not the SARA.
According to Islam cremation is forbidden. We
were informed that the Muslims have their own cemeteries and that
they are exempt from the rule that cremation is compulsory.
A weakness with previous reports concerning freedom
of religion or belief in China is the fact that Islam is rather
invisible compared to Protestantism and Catholicism. The sample
of pieces of information concerning infringements seems haphazard,
and neither does freedom of religion or belief seem to be assessed
in relation to Islamic standards.
The Muslims make up a variety of ethnic groups
and religious traditions. It is therefore important to find a method
to define what may be included in the concept of freedom of religion
or belief, regardless of the particularities of the Muslims. A possible
method for studying the freedom of religion or belief in relation
to Muslims in China would be to focus on how it applies to"Islamic
core values": "aspects of the Islamic normative system
which are of fundamental religious significance to all Muslims". This could be the function
of the mosque, prayer calls, prayer, eating rules, clothes, education
for children etc.
The Chinese expressed acceptance for the need
to study Muslim groups more closely, and we were invited to return
for the studying of Muslim religious communities. Such a visit could
offer an opportunity to establish contacts and obtain new empirical
material, and thereby make possible a more systematic review of
the situation of Muslims in China regarding freedom of religion
or belief.
Catholic mission can be traced back to the time
of the Yuan dynasty (1271-1386). In the 1500s the Jesuits played
a prominent role after having been accepted by the Emperor's court.
Catholic as well as Protestant missionary activities increased after
the end of the Opium war in 1842, and the Catholic Church may have
had about 3.000.000 adherents in the years before the revolution
in 1949.
The diplomatic relation between Beijing and the
Vatican was broken in 1951 when the papal nuncio was banished from
China. Later the nuncios residence was moved to Taipei in Taiwan.
China's patriotic (state approved) Catholic Church (the Chinese
Catholic Patriotic Association) was founded in 1957, and the Chinese
Catholic Bishop's Conference in 1980. After 1957 the Catholic Church
in China has been split into an official "patriotic" church
and an underground church faithful to the Vatican.
It is, however, reason to notice that the underground
church as well as the state approved Patriotic Catholic Church,
have ordinations, sacraments and doctrines which are acceptable
to the Vatican. Thus the Vatican has chosen not to declare the patriotic
church as schismatic (such accusations have sporadically been expressed
in statements from individuals in the Vatican, first and foremost
during the 1950s; this is, however, not representative for the Vatican's
policy).
The ordination of five bishops in the Nantang
cathedral in Beijing on 6 January 2000 aggravated the relation between
Beijing and the Vatican. Ordinations of bishops by the Patriotic
Church is in itself nothing new, but this time the Vatican officially
disapproved of it. In January 2000 there was a hope of a normalisation
of the relation between the Vatican and Beijing, and the ordination
of bishops was looked upon as a provocation. The Vatican's press
spokesman emphasised that "there have been voices from all
sides that express a hope of a normalisation of the relation between
the Holy Chair and Beijing. This event would without doubt be a
hindrance to this process". (Navarro-Valls, ,Fides, 4. January 2000). Bishop Fu denied having any contacts with the Catholic
underground church and claimed that the ordination of the bishops
on 6. January was entirely justified.
The relation between the patriotic Catholic Church
and the underground church is not clear. Apparently there are significant
regional differences, it is reported that in some cases there have
been close relations between the two churches, while in other cases
a rather cool distance. There are said to be bishops who enjoy the
recognition both by "the patriots" and the Vatican. This
does not only include older, Rome-appointed bishop, in 1999 the
Vatican acknowledged several younger bishops who had previously
been ordained in the Patriotic Church without papal mandate. In
1999 three "patriotic" bishops ordained a candidate after
having received papal approval. It is also known that some state
approved priest and bishops are actually loyal to Rome, and it is
said that it is prayed for Pope John Paul II and unity with him
during Masses in several patriotic churches (Fides). At the same time there are Catholics loyal to the regime who regard
members of the underground church and other papal Catholics as traitors.
The Catholic Church outside China might often assist the Patriotic
Church quite openly with theological education in seminars for priests,
and its seminarians are well received in the USA and in Europe.
The Chinese Catholic Church (both the patriotic and the underground)
are receiving economic help from Catholic institutions abroad, for
instance for the printing and distribution of Bibles and other religious
literature.
For laymen around the country the border between
the two churches might be diffuse: It is said that many seek the
closest church regardless of its affiliation. (Stiff penalties may
be imposed if a person is caught attending Mass in an underground
church).
According to Fides the Chinese authorities are now becoming more stringent in their policies
towards the Catholic underground church: From January 2000 onwards
its church are burnt down or blown up. Children of parents belonging
to the underground church are excluded from higher education. According
to Fides this is a result of a secret government decision from August 1999
where the intention is to force the members of the underground church
into the state-controlled Patriotic Church. (Fides
has published excerpts of this document). In January-February 2000
several priest and bishops from the underground church were prisoned,
and Fides gives details about the persecution in Shandong, Zhejiang, Hebei and
the Fujian province. The delegation's visit to the Fujian province
took place only a couple of weeks after the archbishop of Fuzhou,
John Shudao Yang (81) had been arrested. At the present time his
destiny is not known. On a direct question the SARA representative
denied the whole thing.
The number of Catholics today is uncertain: the
Patriotic Church reports about four million; Bishop Fu in Beijing
mentioned five million. The underground church is supposed to have
between eight and ten million followers, according to Fides.
The figures the delegation got from Catholic representatives
were not necessarily the same as those given in brochures received.
It is said that the Catholic Church recruits less than the Protestant.
Nobody seems to have a complete view of the situation, but the division
into two Catholic Churches, and the fact that the Catholic Church
requires from one to two year of preparations before baptism, may
be important brakes. Regardless, the Catholic Church is a minority
in China, and with the exception of a small agricultural area south
of Beijing, there are no predominant Catholic areas or areas with
large Catholic minorities (except Hongkong and Macau).
The patriotic Catholic Church is built up around
two state-controlled organisations (the Patriotic Association and
the Bishop's Conference). We got the impression that there was a
close connection between the leadership of these organisations and
China's political leadership, with representation in the Standing
Committee of the National Political Consultative Conference; Catholics
are also members of state committees.
When we asked how the election of bishops was
organised, we were told that bishops "are appointed by the
priests" (Chancellor J. Berchmans Sheng, Shanghai).
The relation to the Vatican was also touched upon
in Shanghai, where Berchmans emphasised that "we acknowledge
the Holy Chair in Rome". The problem was, he claimed, the Vatican
continued to maintain the nuntio in Taiwan. "If the connection
is restored, the Chinese Catholics will still want to continue managing
their own affairs", he pointed out.
It was emphasised that the church itself paid
the priests and the members of the orders (sisters). The only economic
support received has been for the restoring and rebuilding of churches
damaged during the Cultural Revolution. In Shanghai the renting
out of church property (land) was an important source of income.
Apparently support is also received for special projects. In Shanghai
the archbishop has a printing office where Bibles and other books
are printed, financed through private donations from Italy.
Bishop Fu stressed that the Chinese Catholic Church
is growing; nobody else mentioned this. According to Fu 60-70 000
were baptised every year from the early 1980s. The church recruits
among Buddhists, some Protestants convert, and some have an atheistic
background or join the church due to marriage. Bishop Fu also said
that some students converted. A figure of about 1 000 converts a
year in Beijing was mentioned. Berchmans stressed that in Shanghai
the local Catholics made up a small minority, about 150 000 believers,
about the same as in 1949. He indicated that about 1 000 are baptised
every year and that baptism of adults occurs relatively seldom.
All of them stressed the lack of priests as a
serious problem. For instance, Shanghai has presently 90 churches
in use (300 in 1949), but only 50 priests. Priests have to serve
alone several churches/parishes. The priest at the parish of Xiamen
mentioned that he several times a month had to travel long distances
(for 12-16 hours) in order to visit parishioners in the outlying
districts, often being away for days.
Bishop Fu stressed that the Chinese church now
had 12 seminaries for priests, the most important one in Beijing.
1700 seminarians were studying at these institutions. The education
of a priest takes six years and during the last decade 1200 priests
have completed their studies. Presently one hundred seminarians
study in the USA and Western Europe. At the seminary outside Shanghai
theologians from the West are frequently visiting and teaching for
shorter or longer periods. Today this seminary has 160 students
from all over the country. Shanghai has also a convent for nuns
with 80 sisters who are serving the diocese.
Regarding Catholic monastic orders, we have no
detailed information. (this may be an indication of the need for
regular contact with as well as guidance from the Church outside
China) The archbishop of Shanghai is a Jesuit, and it was asserted
(Berchmans) that a few Dominicans, Benedictines and Don Bosco priests
are active in the area (the Fujian province). On the female side
there is apparently only one branch of the St. Joseph sisters (independent
of foreign countries); bishop Fu mentioned that altogether there
are about 3 000 sisters, and that they receive three years of education.
Organised religious education for children was
only referred to by Bishop Fu. BesidesOtherwise numerous forms of
education are organised for people of every age and for both genders.
In Shanghai they appeared to have a well-organised diocese with
many activities and three Catholic associations. The Association
of Catholic Intellectuals consists of teachers who give free tuition,
Catholic artists are contributing with religious cards (Christmas
cards) that are printed and sold all over China. Doctors and nurses
travel once a week to the satellite towns and to the districts outside
Shanghai in order to render medical help. The female President for
the computer association mentioned that the computer school was
opened in 1993 thanks to support from Italy; the association is
open for people of all age groups. Several activities for elderly
and handicapped people are organised four days a week, the course
fee being extremely low as there are a large number of old persons
in Shanghai. Activities are also organised for students.
Shanghai has a printing works that prints Bibles,
which are distributed all over China. We were told that Protestants
and Catholics cooperate regarding a new translation of the Bible,
otherwise Protestants and Catholics print their own Bibles. Other
religious literature such as prayer books and theological literature
is printed here and distributed by the churches.
In Beijing there were several daily masses, also
in English
Ordinary Catholic practice is to let the children
have their first communion after the age of seven. Chinese practice
seems to be 15-16 years (in the official church). Apparently the
reason is a wish to limit religious influence on children; the parish
priest in Xiamen mentioned that the church has permission to organise
summer camps for youth "where they are being taught ethics".
Burial practice is another peculiarity: The Catholic Church recommends burials, but
has since 1963 modified the ban against cremation. In China cremation
is practised.
Church interior: We only visited three Catholic churches (Beijing, Shanghai, Fuzhou)
that all had ordinary European decorations in 1930s style, there
were no attempts decorate in a Chinese style; the church in Beijing
was incidentally far more well kept than the Fanchuanpu church in
Fuzhou.
Pilgrim centres: One of the most well known Catholic pilgrim places in China is located
outside Shanghai. Every year in May large crowds of pilgrims come
here from all parts of China, 60 000 pilgrims travelled here in
1999. The Maria revelation, which is supposed to have taken place
here, has (so far) no official approval from the Roman-Catholic
Church.
It is important for the improvement of the Catholics'
conditions of freedom of religion or belief that the Chinese authorities
and the Vatican reach a solution to the ongoing conflict.
Sources outside China report about a tightening-up
of Chinese church policies. We did get close to observing this.
We did, however, experience denials and lack of openness. Possibly
the most remarkable points learned through our meetings with the
Patriotic Church were the specific pieces of information that suggested
extensive contacts with the Catholic Church outside China (such
as teachers at Chinese seminaries, economic support for various
projects, Chinese theological students in the West, translation
of religious literature to Chinese, possibly also the presence of
members of international orders and congregations.
Protestant Christianity was introduced to the
Chinese mainland in the beginning of the 1800th century
through western missionaries. Missionary work in China proved to
be difficult for Protestant as well as Catholic missionaries. Gradually
their activities became disputed in China. The official publication
"Freedom of religious belief in China", published in 1997
by the information office of the Chinese government, lists a number
of critical comments to the role of the missionaries and the Christians
in general in connected to significant historical events in China.
These interpretations are used arguments for the official attitude
towards Protestantism and Catholicism, and as a justification of
the emphasis put on independence and national patriotism ("the
three self-principles") in the carrying out and organising
of Protestant and Catholic activities in China after 1949. It is
not possible to explore the question, to what extent this is a consequence
of demands from the authorities, and to what extent this an independent
choice of policy from an unanimous group of Chinese church leaders.
However, all available empirical knowledge suggests that both factors
have been important.
Statistics on religion in China are inaccurate.
However, certain facts can be concluded on the basis of statistical
documentation. In a brochure printed by the Chinese Christian Council
in 1998 it is reported that there were about 700 000 Protestants
in China in 1949, being members of 70 different churches (denominations
such as Lutherans, Methodists, Pentecostalites, Baptists etc.) This
number has lately increased considerably, even though all religions
in China were subject to severe persecutions during the decade of
the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Particularly from 1980 onwards
growth in religious activities has been the general trend in the
development of Chinese society. Mr.Vetvik, who visited China for
the first time in 1979, staying in the country for four weeks, as
well as visiting the country in 1996 and 1999, confirmed that this
change was very visible and very impressive. Official statistics
from the Protestant Church, which is also used by the Chinese authorities,
states the number of Protestants to be 10 million. There are more
than 12 000 churches and 25 000 meeting places. The number of church
workers (clergy) of different categories is 18 000 of whom 3 000
are women.
In addition there are a large number of volunteers
of whom many have received special training for this purpose.
The attendance in the churches is very high and
is steadily increasing. In Shanghai we visited a church, which was
filled to capacity on the particular Sunday we were there. In Fujian
the local SARA reported on Protestantism as the fastest growing
religion in the province.
The picture we have given here refers the official
registered activities. A number of observers and independent sources
estimate that the unregistered activities are extensive. This is,
however, denied by the official spokesmen for both the SARA and
the Protestant Churches who claim that this phenomenon is of marginal
importance.
Internationally there has been a great variety
regarding the leadership and organisation of the Protestant Churches.
It is therefore difficult, if not impossible, to state what is a
normal organisation of a Protestant Church.
What distinguishes the organisation of Protestantism
in China in an international comparison the most striking characteristics
is therefore that they have abolished its division into a variety
of different churches or denominations. This has also happened on
the level of the services of the local congregations. However, it
was said informally during our conversations that the denominations
are to a certain degree still manifested locally. The movement towards
a unification of the Protestant churches began in 1950, based on
the "three self-principles". Common services and organisation
were introduced gradually. In 1954 the national committee for the
Three Self-Protestant Churches was established. In 1980 an organisation
named the China Christian Council was established on a national
level. The headquarters for these organisations are both located
in Shanghai. The difference between them is that the China Christian
Council represents the churches vis-à-vis the authorities
and the outside world, while the Three Self-Committee mostly works
with internal church affairs. Yet is clear that in practice much
overlapping exists.
The China Christian Council became a member of
the World Council of Churches in 1991. During our visit we observed
and read about many examples of increased international contact
between the two central Chinese organisations and the international
organisations and. Such contact was also apparent on the local level.
Another special aspect of the organisation of
Protestantism in China is the fact that there are no bishops, however,
with one exception regarding the famous Bishop Ting in Nanjing who
was ordained before 1949. Ting is not a bishop according to the
official Chinese system, but yet has the authority of a bishop within
the Patriotic Protestant Church. In the Church Council in Shanghai
it was reported that many foreigners believed that the headquarters
for Protestantism was in Nanjing because of Bishop Ting. The fact
that they do not have any bishops was a result of the process of
reorganising and fusion, where a structure without bishops was chosen.
We do not know how the different segments of the Protestant church
look at this today. But this structure it is hardly without problems.
The organisation of the Three Self Churches is
probably partly a result of pressure from the political authorities.
The rapid fusion in the 1950s is said to be based on the fact that
2/3 of the Protestant Christians signed a petition supporting the
three self-principles as a basic document for the reorganisation
of the churches. Even with China's historical experiences as background
we can hardly think that what happened was solely based on free
and voluntary processes among the Protestant Christians themselves.
During our visit we experienced that it was impossible
to get any other answers to main points or to nuances from the church
leaders than those which were given previously from the SARA system,
whose representatives were always present. This is hardly a sign
of unity, but rather of a considerable restricted, strategic adjustment
to the authorities' viewpoint by the church leadership. In a system
with complete religious freedom more nuances would obviously have
been expressed.
As a matter of fact, the reason behind may be
a natural solidarity between the leadership in the church and the
authorities. China is under severe pressure internationally regarding
human rights. Both parties may feel that some of the criticism is
unfair. In such situations it is natural to cover up internal disagreements
that seem less important.
Protestants in China have activities that outwardly
have much in common with those of Protestants in other parts of
the world. Services, bible study groups, choral practices, baptiseings,
weddings etc. are arranged. Some of the churches have deaconal activities
attached to health services like those we saw in Shanghai. In one
of the congregations we visited in Fujian a deacon was appointed
to visit the members of the congregation.
There are 17 theological colleges training clergy
and other persons for the churches. Emphasis is put on printing
and distribution of Bibles, hymn books, periodicals and other Christian
literature, and Christian art etc. An impressive activity has grown
up in a short time, and we were given the opportunity to look closely
at this when visiting a church-run publishing company in Shanghai.
Attempts are made to increase the Chinese content in this activity
and many of the hymns (about 25%) are written by Chinese Protestants.
We also saw examples of Christian fine arts both as prints and illustrations
in books, periodicals etc.
Compared to Protestantism as it appears in many
other countries, an important difference is that the religious activities
are strictly limited to the premises of the registered churches.
The Church is allowed to manifest within the boundaries of the churches,
but not within the sphere of the larger society. No religious education
takes place in Chinese schools. However, this also practised in
some other countries. The printed publications (published by the
churches) are not allowed to be marketed as ordinary books, but
can only be purchased in the premises of the churches, being distributed
via church channels.
In many Protestant churches throughout the rest
of the world it is usual to baptise children. This is not practised
in the Protestant Church in China. We have not discovered any legal
prohibition against this. But according to common policies of the
Chinese State children should not be exposed to religious influence.
Normally one would say that part of the freedom of religion of the
parents is to choose whether to baptise their children or not. At
the same time the question of baptising is one of several examples
showing that the leadership in the church has chosen to abstain
from challenging the authorities. This is specifically solved by
choosing a practice that many other protestant churches have, namely
adult baptising.
Another central point is the question of religious
education of children by the church. At home parents are allowed
to teach their children as they want. However, the role the Protestant
churches normally have in relation to children is practised only
to a small degree in China. Sunday schools are forbidden. But in
these matters we came across examples that may be referred to as
creative mastering. We can observe in many strict regimes, nearby
as well as far away, that inventiveness regarding evasion of the
law when interpreted as not being appropriate or legitimate, might
be extensive. Wise authorities on different levels may face this
by overlooking mild violations of rules by giving a certain freedom
of interpreting these. The problem with is, however, that it may
create a certain insecurity, they never know when the practice is
tightened again. In China, as well as in other places, we can register,
not unexpectedly, certain regional variations regarding the churches'
activities and the relation to their guardians.
In the Protestant churches the young are confirmed
as a regarded as a practice based upon the church's practice of
infant baptising and the systematic Christian upbringing. This does
not occur in the Chinese system.
The restriction on religious activities only to
take place within limited and strictly defined places is unusual
internationally. To Protestants, to whom missionary activities are
a more central part of their religion, this restriction is problematic.
From a Protestant point of view peaceful religious gatherings outside
the registered places are normally regarded as common, natural and
legitimate. The same goes for the possibility to spread religious
literature in society, to hold meetings in orderly manners, etc.
The right to run social and humanitarian institutions
in the society for the citizens, regardless of their faith, has
been a central element in the Protestant deaconal tradition. This
is also clearly stated in the UN's declaration from 1981, though
it is not allowed in China.
A central part of the principle of religious freedom
is the right to celebrate religious holidays. For the Protestants
a problem is connected to the celebration of Christmas. The Protestants
in China change the Christmas celebration to the closest weekend
to 24/25.12. By that they avoid any problems in relation to challenging
the authorities for the right to get time off for this purposes.
A special interesting problem concerns the use
of church bells. We did not see or hear any church bells while visiting
the churches. But it was alleged that some had bells and used them
to call for services. In an informal conversation with one of the
Protestants we met, it was said that they had abstained from the
use of church bells in order to avoid disturbing their neighbours.
Although religion is not offered as a subject
in the Chinese schools, religion is obviously touched upon in subjects
like history and social studies. When questioned about the objectivity
in the description of religion in these cases, we received evasive
answers from the spokesmen for the Protestants, one of them even
a professor in history.
The Chinese authorities and the religious representatives
mentioned several times that they were worried about unfortunate
effects of "superstition" in the society. They separated,
at least in theory, clearly between superstition and the five recognised
religions. In response to questions from us if an objective and
professional education about religion in the schools would counteract
the spreading of superstition, we did not get any straight answers.
But it was said that education in religion in the schools was not
desirable for other reasons. But the question was raised several
times.
We consider the problems we have mentioned here
as central to the discussion of the freedom of religion and its
limitations in China.
Finally, we will emphasise that all our informants
among the Protestants denied that there was any problem at all.
They claimed to be occupied with other and more important problems
for their church, for instance the low level of religious knowledge
of many "new Christians", and the recruiting and training
of religious personnel. These answers are not to be rejected, belittled
or overlooked. It may be said that they represent important historical
experiences concerning social and cultural conditions in the Chinese
society. The answers may to a great degree be a result of a mixture
of strict control and a successful coopting strategy from the Chinese
political leadership, that has given place to parts of the Chinese
religious leadership in the People's Congress and other institutions
in politics and administration, centrally as well as locally.
Because of the above mentioned problems, the Chinese
will probably continue to have the schism between the official ones
and the unregistered churches. Most of the information from independent
sources show that this is far more than a marginal phenomenon as
claimed by the representatives of the official church. Since the
phenomenon continues to be so extensive the reason must a lack of
trust in the authorities, and possibly also in the leadership of
the official church. If freedom of religion or belief really existed,
this phenomenon would have disappeared by itself.
An important critical point regarding unregistered
activities is the fact that the authorities' attempt to counteract
it seems extremely harsh taking the actual "violations"
into consideration. The use of police and prison is often reported
through independent sources. We were told by representatives from
the SARA that in case such activity was discovered, the SARA handled
it. It was sufficient to talk to them, we were told. Any role by
the police in such matters was denied.
During our visit we observed that the organising
of the religious communities is an issue very pertinent to the discussion
of the problems of freedom of religion or belief in China. On this
issue there is a considerable potential for conflicts, not the least
in relation to the two Christian religions. The Chinese mixture
of state and religion, where the state has the authority to define
the legitimacy of religious activity, is a structural violation
of the principle of the freedom of religion. Many of the problems
which the underground churches encounter, are a direct result of
this condition.
A fundamental problem concerns the criteria for
the authorities' recognition of religious communities where a demand
to be subsumed under one of the five recognised religions is evidently
not in accordance with the demands of the conventions. A very relevant
issue in this connection is legitimacy (in relation to the relevant
conventions) of the government’s requirements regarding doctrine
and political conformity in connection with the recognition (or
registration of) religious communities..
In a further dialogue it will be important to discuss how these
policies relate to the conventions.
In our experience it is difficult to separate
between what is "religion in a Chinese context" (given
the fact that time, place and culture influence religion) and what
are the consequences of the authorities' policies on religion. Many
of the representatives of the various religions insisted on offering
justified reasons for much of what could be regarded as violations
of the freedom of religion.
Islam was the religion we saw the least of, and
we are left with more questions than answers after the visit. We
do, however, have the impression that the Chinese authorities define
Islam as culture belonging to Muslim ethnic minority groups. "Islam"
is considered synonymous with "culture", and thereby of
lesser relevance in the discussion of the various aspects of the
freedom of religion or belief in relation to the conventions. This
is of interest in the present context. There may also be positive
implications to the authorities view on this point, for instance
that the Muslims are allowed to have separate cemeteries, and that
they are exempted from the rule of cremation (which is forbidden
according to the Islamic tradition).
An important point regarding the freedom of religion
or belief is that the practice of religion is to be free from any
interference from the authorities, except such regulations that
ensure the maintenance of public safety, health etc. In this respect
the policies of a large number of countries leave much to be desired.
The problem with the Chinese religious policy
in the perspective of the freedom of religion or belief is not just
the thorough control of religion and the fact that religious activity
is strictly limited to the private sphere. It also includes interference
from the authorities regarding preaching through the demand that
it emphasise patriotism, loyalty toward the state, in brief, that
it is politically correct. There are a number of examples of persons
who have not satisfactorily fulfilled these political demands –
resulting in their exclusion from priestly services, theological
seminaries etc.
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