CHAPTER 27 Tad Stahnke, The Right to Engage in Religious Persuasion
Tad Stahnke provides a thorough and balanced overview of the scope and limits of religious persuasion. He defines proselytism as “expressive conduct undertaken with the purpose of trying to change the religious beliefs, affiliation, or identity of another.”108 It is therefore intimately linked with change in religion or belief, which is explored by Nazila Ghanea in her chapter on Apostasy and Freedom to Change Religion or Belief. The attempt to persuade covered by Stahnke’s definition, if successful, results in a change of belief, and if this is a change from another belief, it will appear as apostasy to those who continue to hold the convert’s original belief.
Stahnke reminds us that convictions about obligations to engage in religious persuasion and missionary work are themselves religious in nature, deserving religious freedom protection as surely as other doctrines that a missionary might teach. Stahnke also reminds us of something that, surprisingly, is often overlooked: namely, that efforts to engage in religious persuasion are covered both by freedom of religion and by freedom of expression.109 It thus has “double” human rights protection. States restrict proselytism both directly and indirectly, intentionally and unintentionally, through their various regulations on registration and manifestation of expression and of religion or belief. Though such restrictions may be neutral in construction, they often lead to impermissible discrimination and may violate religious freedom norms in other ways.
Possible criteria for “improper proselytism” are explored by Stahnke; the touchstone he identifies in this area is the notion of coercion. This is where the emphases of Stahnke and Makau Mutua diverge. The former believes that the “preservation of a particular religious tradition, the official ideology of a state, or the religious character of a state’s institutions — divorced from any of the other limitations expressly provided for in international instruments — cannot support limitations on the freedom to manifest religion or belief.”110 Such one-sided protectionisms and penalties, Stahnke argues, are biased and can lead to the abuse of minorities.
108 Stahnke, chapter 27, 620.
109 Ibid., 627.
110 Ibid., 637.
