CHAPTER 12 Janne Haaland Matlary, Implementing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Lessons from the Norwegian Chairmanship of the OSCE
Acknowledging that OSCE commitments are “politically” rather than “legally binding,” Matlary’s chapter provides both practical insight into the internal workings of OSCE institutions and theoretical insight into the significance of the “soft power” instruments utilized in the OSCE. Her chapter is an important reminder to those working in the field of religious human rights that instruments of “soft power” can often be as effective and sometimes even more so than “hard law.”56 These instruments include persuasion, legal and political aid, as well as both open and discreet criticism. Among other things, precisely because they are not legally binding, OSCE commitments can be considerably more detailed and comprehensive than legally binding commitments, and this has substantially augmented their force. They link human rights more clearly to democracy and the rule of law and provide policy prescriptions that can help guide practical realization of religious freedom ideals.
Matlary also discusses how OSCE missions and various monitoring mechanisms come together to ensure the implementation of commitments. During the Norwegian Chairmanship of the organization in 1999, the goals of mainstreaming consideration of religious freedom into OSCE missions and highlighting the importance of freedom of religion in conflict resolution were uppermost. Matlary reports setbacks and some persistent failures in the field of religious freedom. Even so, the experience from the Norwegian Chairmanship of the OSCE bears out the case for political promotion of religious freedom through work with an array of soft power mechanisms and initiatives, and in close cooperation with religious communities, with NGOs, and with academia. In this respect, Matlary’s chapter complements in interesting ways that of Elizabeth Sewell (chapter 38) on facilitating freedom of religion or belief through NGOs. The examples of how religious dialogue was used as a strategy in conflict prevention or resolution should also be of particular interest.
56 Matlary, chapter 12, 259–61.
